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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON POLICY EVALUATION FROM AN ENVIRONMENTAL AND A
REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE
BY
MOHAMMED TAHA KASIM
June 2016
Committee Chair: Dr. H. Spencer Banzhaf
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation consists of three essays, which explore how public policies inﬂuence
household and ﬁrm behavior, and the impact policies could have on environmental outcomes.
The essays examine how households respond to price-based policies, the impact information
disclosure policies could have on environmental outcomes, and ﬁnally the inﬂuence of nor-
mative appeals and non-pecuniary strategies on behavioral outcomes. Understanding these
adjustments in the behavior of the agents is particularly important for policy design and for
legislators who intend maximize societal beneﬁt.
The ﬁrst essay, titled Matchmaking Between Vehicle Miles Traveled and Fuel Economy:
the Role of Gasoline Prices, studies a potential eﬀect of gasoline prices that has been over-
looked in the literature. Due to heterogeneity in demand for vehicle miles traveled (VMT),
when gasoline prices increase, the increased cost of operating an ineﬃcient vehicle are greater
for households that drive more. Thus, in equilibrium, after an increase in the gasoline prices
there should be a stronger matching from households, based on their VMT, to the fuel econ-
omy of the cars they own. Potentially, this matching eﬀect could save 15% of US gasoline
consumption, even with no eﬀect on individual VMT and no eﬀect on the vehicle ﬂeet. Us-
ing conﬁdential data from the National Highway Transportation Survey, the eﬀect of higher
gasoline prices on such assortative matching is estimated using a variety of econometric
models. For all the diﬀerent model speciﬁcations, the matching eﬀect is signiﬁcant and quite
robust. This is the ﬁrst study to analyze this re-allocation or matching eﬀect.
The second essay, titled Evaluating the Eﬀectiveness of an Environmental Disclosure
Policy: an Application to New South Wales, examines the impact of an environmental infor-
mation disclosure policy on environmental outcomes. The main purpose of introducing an
environmental information disclosure strategy is to reduce informational asymmetries and
put pressure on ﬁrms to reduce emissions. This paper studies the impact of such a policy
on air quality in New South Wales, Australia. A regression discontinuity design is employed
and the results show that the pollutant concentration levels were not signiﬁcantly aﬀected
after the implementation of the policy. Empirically, the estimates of the eﬀects under the
discontinuity-based Ordinary Lease Squares (OLS) model have the opposite sign for some
of the pollutants relative to the estimates from the basic OLS model. Therefore, basing
conclusions on the OLS results will engender incorrect inference. Discontinuity-based results
are robust to diﬀerent model speciﬁcations.
The third essay, titled What Determines Citizen Trust: Evaluating the Impact of Cam-
paigns Highlighting Government Reforms in Pakistan explores how normative appeals and
awareness campaigns could inﬂuence societal and political trust. This project is in collab-
oration with Musharraf Cyan and Michael K. Price. The purpose of this study is two-fold.
Firstly, the impacts of exposure to violence and conﬂict on general levels of trust, measures of
life-satisfaction, and attitudes towards formal and informal institutions are examined in the
province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Pakistan. Secondly, the impacts of targeted mes-
sages, which were designed to inform the citizens regarding new government reforms (aimed
at increasing transparency, protecting and strengthening private property rights, and im-
proving service delivery), on general levels of trust and attitudes towards institutions are
studied. For the analysis an in-person survey was designed, which was conducted in ran-
domly selected villages throughout KPK. Empirical results show that exposure to violence
has a negative impact on trust and measures of life-satisfaction and has positive eﬀects on
formal institutions. The results also suggest that the awareness campaigns aﬀected trust lev-
els and perceptions about the quality of public services positively. Moreover when the eﬀects
are allowed to diﬀer based on exposure to conﬂict, important heterogeneity is identiﬁed. The
results are robust to diﬀerent model speciﬁcations.
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Chapter 1: Matchmaking between vehicle miles traveled and fuel
economy: the role of gasoline prices
I. Introduction
In 2011, private passenger vehicles accounted for 70% of petroleum consumed in the US and
12% of the total US greenhouse gas (GIG) emissions.1 Besides CO2, combustion of gasoline
also produces other pollutants such as carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NOx) and
volatile organic compounds. Possible health eﬀects of these pollutants include headaches,
stress, respiratory issues, heart diseases and death, particularly among children. Studies
have shown that in-uteri and childhood exposure to these gasses have the potential to aﬀect
various health outcomes in the short- and the long-run.2
Policies to address such pollution generally fall into two categories: performance-based
policies and price-based policies. In the US, the most prominent performance standard is
the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, ﬁrst introduced in 1975 with the
purpose of improving fuel economy of vehicles. The program requires automobile manu-
facturers to meet fuel economy standards for passenger cars and light trucks. The current
industry-wide combined standard under the program is 29 miles per gallon (MPG), which
will eventually increase to 35.5 MPG by 2016.3 Other performance-based policies are tax
credits to households purchasing fuel eﬃcient automobiles, provision of subsidies to house-
holds who retire their gas guzzlers and giving perks to owners of hybrid vehicles.4 Taxing
1The ﬁrst statistic was calculated from US Energy Information Administration (EIA)'s Monthly Energy
Review (April 2013). The second statistic comes from Inventory of US Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks
1990-2011 published by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2012. The US EPA prepares
this document annually as per the conditions set by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC).
2For a review of these studies see Currie et al. (2014) and Zivin and Neidell (2013).
3This was announced by President Obama, as part of the National Policy of Fuel Eﬃciency, on May 19,
2009. These expected US fuel economy standards are not as stringent as those employed in other countries.
For example, the European Union and Japan plan on increasing the standards to 60.6 MPG and 55.1 MPG
by 2020, respectively. This is highlighted in Comparison of Actual and Projected Fuel Economy Standards
developed by the International Council for Clean Transportation.
4For example, a number of states (Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, New Jersey, New
York, Tennessee, Utah and Virginia) have initiated the Clean Air Stickers Program under which stickered
hybrids are allowed to use the HOV lanes. Bento et al. (2012) studied such a policy for California and found
1
gasoline is the obvious price-based policy. The US has the lowest gasoline taxes among the
developed countries (US Department of Energy). As of 2015, the average gasoline tax in the
US was $0.46 per gallon (federal plus state) while in Germany and the UK it was $4.10 per
gallon and $3.95 per gallon (including VAT), respectively.
One drawback of performance standards like the CAFE is that a decline in emissions
through the utilization channel is not optimally exploited. That is, performance standards
do not provide incentives for reduction in vehicle miles traveled (VMT) and may even do the
opposite.5 Two eﬀects of changes in gasoline taxes on VMT have been noted. Firstly, gasoline
taxes increase gasoline prices and change gasoline consumption through the utilization eﬀect.
Secondly, an increase in gasoline prices results in the evolution of the ﬂeet towards more fuel
eﬃcient vehicles. This is the compositional eﬀect and its magnitude will depend on the
elasticity of ﬂeet fuel economy to gas prices.
Bento et al. (2009) is one of the few papers that studies both the utilization and the
compositional eﬀects. They use a multi-market simulation model to evaluate the eﬃciency
and the distributional implications of changes in gasoline taxes. They ﬁnd that most of
the reduction in gasoline use is through reduction in VMT and that improvements in ﬂeet-
wide fuel economy are small, particularly in the short-run. Over the long-run, the average
fuel economy is inﬂuenced by changes in ﬂeet composition due to increases in fuel eﬃcient
new vehicle sales and price-induced increases in fuel-economy of given models, but still fuel
economy accounts for a small share of the decline in aggregate gasoline consumption.
Li et al. (2014) address the question of how people respond to gasoline tax changes. Ef-
fects of changes in prices depends on the expectations of future fuel costs. Since automobiles
are a durable good, consumers may respond diﬀerently to changes in gasoline prices due
to taxes (permanent changes) from what they believe to be less permanent shocks (short
that it resulted in a transfer from car-poolers to hybrid owners plus net social beneﬁts were negative. Since
an average hybrid owner earns more than an average car-pooler, such a policy is probably very regressive
(at least in California).
5For an overview of literature that studies how CAFE standards aﬀect the new vehicle market, see Klier
and Linn (2010).
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run supply interruptions or changes in the price of crude oil). If consumers believe that oil
price shocks are less likely to persist than taxes, consumers might respond relatively more
to variation in taxes. The ﬁndings of the study suggest that a tax increase shifts demand
for fuel eﬃcient cars positively but there is no strong correlation with VMT. Gasoline taxes
reduce the sales of low MPG vehicles and increase the sales of high MPG vehicles and these
eﬀects are larger than the eﬀects of increases of tax-exclusive prices. The study also ﬁnds
that gasoline price changes aﬀect the market share of new vehicles more strongly than used
cars. The diﬀerential impact of taxes and other price shocks on gasoline consumption is
driven by the diﬀerential impact on the fuel economy of new vehicles.
Li et al. (2009) study the compositional eﬀect by explicitly looking at how gasoline prices
aﬀect the ﬂeet fuel economy. They ﬁnd that an increase in gasoline prices shifts the demand
modestly for new cars towards more fuel eﬃcient vehicles and lowers the sales of less fuel
eﬃcient cars. They also ﬁnd that fuel eﬃcient used vehicles stay in the market longer in
response to a gasoline price increase. Busse et al. (2013) analyze the role of gasoline prices in
inﬂuencing individual's purchasing decisions and the prices that they pay in the used and the
new car markets. Diﬀerent equilibrium outcomes are expected in the two markets because of
diﬀerences in the market structures and the supply of new and used cars. The results show
that the demand for ineﬃcient cars shifts left relative to eﬃcient cars when gasoline prices
increase. In the new car markets this has a price and a quantity eﬀect, whereas in the used
car markets it only has a price eﬀect.
The results of Li et al. (2009) and Busse et al. (2013) suggest a potential third eﬀect
that has been overlooked in the literature. Increases in gasoline taxes decrease the demand
for fuel ineﬃcient cars through the price eﬀect. But there is heterogeneity among agents
in the demand for VMT. When gasoline prices rise, the cost of operating an ineﬃcient
vehicle increases relative to an eﬃcient car. However, the cost diﬀerences are greater for the
household that drives more relative to others. Thus, it is probable that the variability in the
demand shock results in an increase in the market share of larger, fuel ineﬃcient automobiles
3
for low-VMT types relative to the market share of ineﬃcient vehicles for high-VMT types.
As a result, there will be a shift in the matching of cars to households: households who drive
more will be even more likely than other households to switch to a more fuel eﬃcient car.
Thus, in equilibrium, after an increase in gasoline prices there should be a stronger matching
from households, based on the amount of driving they are likely to do, to the fuel economy
of the cars they own. This is the ﬁrst study that analyzes this re-allocation or matching
eﬀect.
In Figure 1, miles per gallon (MPG) is plotted against VMT for the years 2001 and
2009. Two things are of interest in Figure 1. The ﬁrst is the variation in actual values
over time. Between 2001 and 2009, as gasoline prices increased, the relationship between
these two variables went from slightly decreasing to slightly increasing. The second thing of
interest in Figure 1 is the comparison between the actual values and the hypothetical values
under "perfect matching". Under perfect matching, the highest-VMT households would
be driving the most eﬃcient cars and the lowest-VMT households would be driving the least
eﬃcient cars. Notice that in this hypothetical scenario, I did not change the amount of
miles households are driving (utilization eﬀect) nor did I change the composition of the ﬂeet
(compositional eﬀect). A comparison of the two pairs of lines across the years shows that in
2009 when gasoline prices were higher, the matching eﬀect was much stronger. This leads to
substantial savings in fuel consumption. To gauge the potential importance of the matching
eﬀect, if household demand for VMT and vehicle fuel eﬃciency were perfectly matched in
2009, gasoline consumption would have been 15% less than actual gasoline consumption,
even with no change in the composition of the ﬂeet and no change in individual VMT.6 The
ability to work through this matching channel is another advantage of price-based policies
over performance-based policies, one that has been overlooked in the literature.
6National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) data was used to make this calculation. In the NHTS
survey, counter-factual gasoline consumption for a particular vehicle is being compared to actual gasoline
consumption.
4
Figure 1: Is there a matching eﬀect?
Notes: These graphs were constructed using reported annual miles from the NHTS 2001 and the 2009
conﬁdential survey ﬁles and the vehicle fuel economy data from the Department of Energy. Actual
values in both the graphs represent a linear regression of fuel economy on vehicle miles traveled
(VMT). For perfect matching, vehicles were assigned to households based on their respective VMT.
5
Econometrically, a basic check for the matching eﬀect would be executing a Diﬀerence-
in-Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences (DDD) model. This particular model compares the change in
fuel economy of high-VMT households to low-VMT households between periods with com-
paratively high and low gasoline prices. However, an issue with this simple approach is
that VMT is endogenous to fuel economy. High-VMT households are more likely to adopt
a fuel eﬃcient vehicle. But households with more fuel eﬃcient vehicles might also drive
more. To overcome the simultaneity issue, I use an instrumental variables strategy where
the interactions of household characteristics with gasoline prices are used as instruments.
The purpose of this study is to describe the correlation between the heterogeneous eﬀects
of a change in gasoline prices on the type of vehicles diﬀerent people drive and how those
eﬀects are correlated with VMT-propensity. However, due to these instrumental variables, I
cannot control for important heterogeneous treatment eﬀects of higher gasoline prices in the
second stage. To overcome this problem one could predict the eﬀect of gasoline prices on
fuel economy for diﬀerent households and then regress these predicted eﬀects on predicted
VMT to estimate the correlation between the predicted VMT and the treatment eﬀects of
higher gasoline prices on MPG. Alternatively, I create instruments for VMT using Bento
et al.'s (2009) structural model. VMT in the latter strategy is a non-linear function of de-
mographics. Following this method I could include heterogeneous household eﬀects in the
second stage and also obtain a causal matching eﬀect.
For all these diﬀerent methodologies, the matching eﬀect is signiﬁcant and quite robust.
The matching eﬀect ranges from 0.02 to 0.13. These results indicate that when the gasoline
price increases by $1, a vehicle that is driven 1000 more annual miles, on average gives 0.02
to 0.13 more miles per gallon. The higher coeﬃcients come from the model that uses a
non-linear function of VMT as an instrumental variable.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section II explains the matching eﬀect
using a theoretical model, Section III details the diﬀerent econometric methodologies used to
6
analyze the matching eﬀect, Section IV describes the data, Section V presents and interprets
the results and Section VI concludes.
II. Theoretical framework
A partial equilibrium model is suﬃcient to explain the mechanism of the matching eﬀect.
Let there be two types of households that diﬀer only in terms of exogenous demand for VMT:
high-VMT households (H) and low-VMT households (L). Let there be two car types: fuel-
ineﬃcient (I) and fuel-eﬃcient (E). In Figure 2 Panel A, heterogeneity in demand among
agents for VMT is reﬂected by DH and DL, which indicate the relative willingness to pay
(WTP) of each respective household-type for ineﬃcient cars relative to eﬃcient cars. This
WTP could be positive or negative. I take no stand on whether the high-VMT types or
the low-VMT types have a higher WTP. Figure 2 shows an example of a baseline reference
scenario where DH0 = D
L
0 . The market demand is D0 for a relative price P0.
In Figure 2 Panel A when gasoline prices increase, the relative WTP for ineﬃcient vehicles
falls. The new market demand is D1 and the price falls to P1 in the vehicle market. This is
consistent with Busse et al. (2013) and Li et al. (2014). My conjecture is that the relative
WTP for an ineﬃcient automobile will particularly decrease for the high-VMT types, as
higher gasoline prices translate into greater costs for them. This is shown in this ﬁgure
where DH1 is now lower than D
L
1 . As a consequence, in equilibrium, the low-VMT types
now have a greater share of the ineﬃcient vehicles than before ( A
A+B
versus 1
2
). By the same
logic, as shown in Panel B, the high-VMT types now have a greater proportion of eﬃcient
vehicles relative to the baseline case.
The above model can also be represented mathematically. Again consider two types of
households i ∈ {H, L} that diﬀer solely on VMT: high-VMT households (H) and low-VMT
households (L). I consider a continuum of automobiles that diﬀer only in terms of gallons
per mile (GPM) where GPM = 1
MPG
. The WTP function for household i is given as follows:
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WTP i(GPM) = f i(GPM)− VMT i(P g)×GPM × P g (1)
where f i(GPM) represents preferences for a particular vehicle type and P g is the price of
gasoline. The WTP of household i for a small change in GPM is given as follows.
∂WTP i
∂GPM
=
∂f i(GPM)
∂GPM
− VMT i(P g)× P g (2)
The WTP is a function of marginal preferences, VMT demand and gasoline prices. When
gasoline prices increase, the WTP will decrease but ∂WTP i will diﬀer due to the cost
diﬀerences between the households based on the amount of driving they do. Consider an
increase in gasoline prices by dP g. Diﬀerentiating equation (2) with respect to P g gives the
change in relative WTP for GPM when the gasoline price increases. This is given below:
∂2WTP i
∂GPM · ∂P g = −
∂VMT i(P g)
∂P g
× P g︸ ︷︷ ︸ −
elasticity of VMT i
w.r.tP g × VMT
VMT i(P g)︸ ︷︷ ︸
household i ′sVMT
(3)
where the ﬁrst term is the elasticity of VMT with respect to P g and the second term rep-
resents the respective VMT i demands. We already know that VMTH > VMTL. My
hypothesis is that when the gasoline price increases, the relative WTP for an ineﬃcient vehi-
cle will decrease much more for a high-VMT household compared to the decrease in relative
WTP for an ineﬃcient vehicle for a low-VMT household. That is, ∂
2WTPH
∂GPM ·∂P g <
∂2WTPL
∂GPM ·∂P g .
Using equation (3) this implies,
−
(
∂VMTH(P g)
∂P g
× P g
)
− VMTH(P g) < −
(
∂VMTL(P g)
∂P g
× P g
)
− VMTL(P g)
−HVMTH − VMTH < −LVMTL − VMTL
VMTH(H + 1) > VMTL(L + 1)
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VMTH
VMTL
>
L + 1
H + 1
(4)
where i are VMT i- gasoline price elasticities for household i. Since VMTH > VMTL, the
LHS in the inequality above is greater than one. The RHS is dependent on relative VMT
elasticities with respect to gasoline prices. In the previous literature, average VMT short-
run elasticities with respect to gasoline prices are in the range of [−0.3, −0.1] (see Bento et
al. (2009), Graham and Glaister (2002), Gillingham (2014), Hughes, Knittel, and Sperling
(2007), and Small and van Dender (2007)).
Thus, the only threat to the inequality given by (4) is when |L| < |H | and the diﬀerence
between elasticities is large.7 However, it is expected that |H | < |L|. That is, the high-VMT
households are less willing to reduce VMT when gasoline prices increase (they are high-VMT
types for a reason after all!). Rather than compromising on VMT by a large margin, it is
expected that these households adopt a more fuel eﬃcient vehicle. Hence, it is expected that
the inequality given by (4) will most likely hold.8 This implies that when faced with higher
gasoline prices, the high-VMT households are likely to adopt a more fuel eﬃcient vehicle
relative to the low-VMT households. Hence, in equilibrium an increase in the gasoline price
will result in agglomeration of fuel ineﬃciency among the low-VMT types and concentration
of fuel eﬃciency among the high-VMT types: the matching eﬀect.
7Given that absolute VMT elasticities with respect to gasoline prices have been found to be less than
one in the previous literature, I do not consider the cases where absolute elasticities are greater than one.
8Given the previous estimates of elasticities, as a worst case scenario consider the low-VMT and the
high-VMT households to be on the extremes of this range, i.e. L ≈ −0.1 and H ≈ −0.3. The inequality
given by (4) then would imply 0.90.7 ≈ 1.29. As long as the high-VMT households drive 29% more than the
low-VMT households, the inequality will hold. In the 2001 and the 2009 NHTS data-sets the average VMT
of the 75th percentile is ten times larger than the average VMT of the 25th percentile. Using the NHTS data-
sets and the ACCRA gasoline prices, VMT-gasoline price elasticity for the lowest and the highest quartiles
are -0.18 and -0.11, respectively. The diﬀerences in elasticities between the lowest and the highest quartiles
are small plus the low-VMT types are relatively more sensitive to price changes. This is also consistent with
the Cournot aggregation condition.
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III. Econometric methodology
This section details the econometric methods used to estimate the matching eﬀect. The
question of interest is determining how the fuel economy of vehicles driven by households
that drive more relative to others is aﬀected when gasoline prices increase. A basic check for
this would be to run the following Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences (DDD) regression.
The DDD model compares the change in fuel economy of high-VMT households to low-VMT
households between periods with comparatively high and low gasoline prices.
MPGijct = α + βPrice
gas
ct + γVMTijct + θ [Price
gas
ct × VMTijct]
+ Xictδ + [Price
gas
ct ×Xict]ϕ+ ηc + λt + εijct (5)
where, MPGijct is miles per gallon of vehicle j owned by household i in city c in year t,
Pricegasct is the per gallon price of gasoline in city c in year t, VMTijct is VMT of vehicle
j owned by household i in city c in year t, Xict are demographic variables of household i,
ηc are city ﬁxed eﬀects, λt are year ﬁxed eﬀects and εijct is the idiosyncratic error term.
The matching eﬀect of higher gasoline prices is represented by θ and if the matching eﬀect
exists, θ > 0. In equation (5), λt is included to control for time-varying unobservables and
ηc is included to control for time-invariant city-speciﬁc unobservables. The interactions of
the household characteristics with gasoline prices are included to control for heterogeneous
eﬀects of gasoline prices.
A potential issue with this simple approach, however, is that VMT is endogenous to
the fuel eﬃciency of the car. It is expected that VMT will aﬀect the MPG of the chosen
car (VMT  MPG). But there is also a greater likelihood that households with more fuel
eﬃcient vehicles drive more (MPG VMT). The latter is known as the rebound eﬀect. Due
to a more fuel eﬃcient vehicle, cost per mile decreases so households drive more. Therefore,
VMT and the interaction term in the above equation are not exogenous. Recent evidence has
suggested that this eﬀect is fairly small (Gillingham et al. (2013), and Small and van Dender
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(2007)). If so, this endogeneity problem might be small enough to ignore. Accordingly, I
ﬁrst use DDD-OLS to estimate (5).
Nevertheless, the possibility of simultaneity cannot be ignored entirely. Accordingly, I
use a Two-Stages Least Squares (2SLS) strategy. One strategy is to use the interactions of
household characteristics with gasoline prices as instruments for VMT, while still allowing
the household characteristics to enter the MPG equation linearly (just not interacted with
gasoline prices). Using this strategy, I estimate the following model:
VMTijct = a+ Xictb + cPrice
gas
ct + [Price
gas
ct ×Xict]d+ ηc + λt + µijct (6)
MPGijct = α+ βPrice
gas
ct + γ̂VMTijct + θ[Price
gas
ct × ̂VMTijct] + Xictδ+ ηc + λt + εijct (7)
where, Xict includes household characteristics and the interactions of these with gasoline
prices serve as instruments. These characteristics are the same as those used as controls
in the DDD-OLS model. In this particular strategy VMTijct is ﬁrst estimated as a linear
function of demographics, per gallon price of gasoline in the city and the interactions of
these demographics with the gasoline price (equation (6)). In the second-stage (equation
(7)), instead of actual VMT, predicted VMT (̂VMTijct) enters the MPG equation.9 The
matching eﬀect is again represented by θ. An issue with the approach above is that one
cannot separately identify Pricegasct ×Xict in the second stage structural equation given by
(7). In other words this model only has a causal interpretation if X has no eﬀect on the
elasticity of MPG with respect to gasoline prices conditioning on VMT. Heterogeneity in the
eﬀect of gasoline prices on MPG by VMT cannot be separately identiﬁed from heterogeneity
in X.
If this restriction is unsatisfactory, two additional approaches can be considered. The ﬁrst
is to give up on a causal interpretation and simply ask how the heterogeneous eﬀects on MPG
9Note that there are two endogenous variables in the model given by (5). Since, VMT enters the
interaction term that represents the matching eﬀect, VMT×Pricegas is also endogenous. Hence, there are
two ﬁrst stage regressions in the 2SLS strategy.
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due to changes in gasoline prices (∂MPG/∂Pricegas) are correlated with predicted VMT (V̂ MT ).
One could predict the eﬀect of gasoline price on fuel economy for diﬀerent households and
then regress these predicted eﬀects on predicted VMT. Consider the following two equations:
MPGijct = α + Xictβ + δPrice
gas
ct + [Price
gas
ct ×Xict]θ + ηc + λt + εijct (8)
VMTijct = a+ Xictb+ cPrice
gas
ct + [Price
gas
ct ×Xict]d+ ηc + λt + µijct (9)
where VMT and MPG are simultaneously determined and thus E [εµ] 6= 0. Given that
E [Xε] = E [Pricegasε] = E [Xµ] = E [Pricegasµ] = 0, (8) and (9) can be estimated with the
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approach. To accomplish this one could follow the algorithm
given below:
1. Estimate equation (8) by OLS and let T̂ = ∂M̂PG/∂Pricegas = δ̂+Xictθ̂ be the treatment
eﬀect of a change in gasoline prices on MPG for a household with characteristics X.
2. Estimate equation (9) by OLS and let V̂ MT = â+Xictb̂+ĉP ricegas+
[
Pricegas ×Xict
]
d̂
where Pricegas is the average gasoline price. These are predicted household VMT at
the average gasoline price. VMT is predicted at average gasoline prices to overcome
the issue of correlation between MPG and VMT.
3. To estimate the correlation between ∂M̂PG/∂Pricegas and V̂ MT , run the following regres-
sion.
T̂ = pi0 + pi1V̂ MT + ϕ (10)
where the coeﬃcient of interest is pi1.
However, this whole process is equivalent to estimating the following model.
MPGijct = α + βPrice
gas
ct + Xictγ + θ
[
̂VMTijct × Pricegasct
]
+ ηc + λt + ξijct (11)
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where V̂ MT is the predicted VMT at average gasoline prices. The proof in Appendix A shows
that estimating equation (11) is equivalent to the procedure laid down by the algorithm. The
matching eﬀect in equation (11) is given by the coeﬃcient θ. However, this strategy merely
provides a correlation between the predicted VMT and the treatment eﬀect of dPricegas.
An alternative strategy is to use a structural model which identiﬁes both eﬀects through
non-linearities. However, to get a causal impact one could re-visit the strategy given by
equations (6) and (7) . If VMT is a non-linear function of household characteristics in (6), I
could include Pricegasct ×Xict in (7) and get a causal impact of the matching eﬀect on MPG.
One strategy to accomplish this could be creating instruments using Bento et al.'s (2009)
structural model. In the latter strategy, VMT will be a non-linear function of demographics
and vehicle characteristics. Bento et al. (2009) use the following indirect utility function in
their model:
V
′
ij = −
1
λi
exp
(
−λi
(
Yi/Ti − rij
pxi
))
− 1
βij
exp
(
αij + βij
pMij
pxi
)
+ τij (12)
where, αij = α˜Ti z
α
ij; βij = − exp
(
β˜Ti z
β
ij
)
; λi = exp
(
λ˜Ti z
λ
i
)
; τij = τ˜Ti z
τ
ij; rij is vehicle rental
price; pMij is vehicle utilization price; and p
x
i is the Hicksian composite commodity price and
Yi is the household income. Ti is a ﬁxed number of choice occasions and they are set equal
to the number of adults in the household plus one.10 zαij, z
β
ij, z
τ
ij are alternative automobile
characteristics (age, make, class dummies) interacted with household demographics and zλi
are household characteristics. Using Roy's identity, VMT for household i using car j can be
written as:
VMTij = exp
(
αij + βij
pMij
pxi
+ λi
(
Yi/Ti − rij
pxi
))
(13)
10If the number of adults is less than the number of household vehicles, Ti equals the number of household
vehicles.
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One can predict V̂ MT ij(i) by using the above model, but V̂ MT ij(i) still would be endogenous
to MPG through the vehicle characteristics z, which are simultaneously chosen. However,
I can predict VMT of household i at a ﬁxed set of characteristics. In particular, I use the
median car attributes in the sample.11 Using V̂ MT ij¯ as an instrument, I then estimate the
following model:
VMTijct = a+ bV̂ MT ij¯ct + cPrice
gas
ct + d[V̂ MT ij¯ct × Pricegasct ] + ηc + λt + µijct (14)
MPGijct = α + βPrice
gas
ct + Xictδ + [Price
gas
ct ×Xict]ρ+ piV̂MTijct+
θ
[
Pricegasct × ̂VMTijct
]
+ ηc + λt + εijct (15)
In the ﬁrst-stage, VMT is a function of gasoline prices and V̂ MT ij¯ct. The matching eﬀect is
again given by θ: the coeﬃcient associated with the interaction term between gasoline prices
and V̂ MT ij¯ct. The model given by equations (14) and (15) overcomes the issues associated
with the previous models. An advantage of this particular model over the model given by
equations (6) and (7) is that now I can include Pricegasct ×Xict in the second-stage. These
will capture heterogeneous eﬀects of a change in gasoline prices on MPG. An advantage this
particular model has over the model given by equation (11) is that this model gives a causal
interpretation to the coeﬃcient of interest. The next section describes the data-set used for
the analysis.
IV. Data construction
The data-set being used for the analysis could be divided into three major sections: (i) a
random sample of US households illustrating their driving patterns and modal choice from
the 2001 and the 2009 National Household Travel Survey (NHTS), (ii) quarterly gasoline
11Bento et al. (2009) categorized households into twelve diﬀerent strata based on employment status,
average household age and the number and age distribution of children in the household. Vehicles are
categorized by vehicle class. For more see Bento et al. (2009).
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prices data obtained from the American Chamber of Commerce's ACCRA Cost of Living
Index (COLI) database and (iii) the fuel economy data from the Department of Energy.
These data-sets were merged to produce a distinct data-set which provides information on
driving habits, household characteristics, average gasoline prices paid and the fuel economy
of vehicles owned by these households.
The 2001 NHTS sample consists of 69,815 households and the 2009 NHTS consists of
150,147 households for both urban and rural areas in the US.12 The 2001 NHTS was con-
ducted from March 2001 through June 2002 and the 2009 NHTS was conducted between
March 2008 and May 2009. Both these data-sets contain information on household driving
patterns: vehicle miles traveled and the type of car/s owned by the household (make, model,
vintage). Furthermore, the data-sets also provide household (income, number of household
members, age distribution, race, work status) and neighborhood characteristics (population
density, housing structure, presence of public transport) data and fuel economy data for
household vehicles.13 For the main analysis conﬁdential NHTS data for both years was used.
The conﬁdential data details geographic location of each household (state, Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA), and zip code).14 After cleaning the data, we are left with 23,739
households in the 2001 sample and 137,610 households in the 2009 sample.15
12The 2001 NHTS was released in three diﬀerent versions. Versions 1 and 2, released in 2003 contains
data for 26,038 households and Version 3, released in 2004, supplemented earlier versions with data from
more than 40,000 add-on interviews.
13NHTS collected VMT data through (i) direct questioning; (ii) estimations based on odometer ratings
(only for 2001 NHTS); and (iii) estimations based on travel diaries. NHTS data reports two diﬀerent measures
of VMT. (1) Reported VMT which was based on (i) and (2) bestmiles based on regression techniques
combining information from all three reporting techniques. Since, bestmiles requires more information,
this variables had more missing values compared to VMT. In the main analysis (1) was used as a measure of
VMT and (2) was used wherever (1) is missing. Household with both measures missing were dropped. Both
measures ranged from 0 to 200,000 miles. However, mileage below 100 and above 60,000 were considered to
be inconceivable and were therefore dropped. This resulted in 25,396 (17%) and 47,247 (14%) observations
to be deleted from the 2001 and 2009 NHTS data, respectively. Bento et al. (2009) follow the same strategy.
VMT was divided by 1000 for ease of interpretation of the coeﬃcient estimates. The results with these
assumptions relaxed are similar to the main results and are available upon request.
14I would like to thank the staﬀ at the Department of Transportation (DOT) for assistance in getting
access to the conﬁdential NHTS data ﬁles.
15The data was restricted to vehicles that were driven at least 100 miles and at most 60,000 miles
annually. The values not in this range are considered unrealistic and therefore were dropped from the data.
Furthermore, vehicles that were more than 24 years old in the samples were dropped. Vehicles older than 24
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The question of interest is how these households respond to changes in gasoline prices.
Previous studies have suggested that gasoline prices take a random walk and only current
prices aﬀect consumer decisions. Berry et al. (1995), Goldberg (1995) and Bento et al. (2009)
assume that gasoline prices take a random walk and only current prices matter. However
if prices are mean reverting, then historical prices will also aﬀect consumer decisions today.
If this is true then studies with the random walk assumption underestimate the long-run
eﬀects of a permanent tax increase. David and Hamilton (2004) and Geman (2007) have
shown that gasoline prices do actually follow a random walk. Li et al. (2009) also ﬁnd
the lagged gasoline prices have little impact on purchasing decisions. Finally, Anderson
et al. (2013) and Anderson et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence, which suggests that
on average expected real gasoline prices are equal to current prices. Since only current
gasoline prices matter, quarterly gasoline prices for the years 2001, 2002, 2008 and 2009
were purchased from the American Chamber of Commerce's ACCRA Cost of Living Index
(COLI) database. ACCRA provides data for more than 300 MSAs. Given the geographical
indicators of the NHTS data, these prices were matched with each household in the NHTS
data-sets.16 The US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) USPS ZIP
Code Crosswalk Files were used to merge the ACCRA data with the conﬁdential NHTS
data-sets. Finally, the fuel economy data was obtained from the Department of Energy's
website www.fueleconomy.gov.17 This website provides the fuel economy data by vehicle
years are not identiﬁed in the 2009 NHTS sample. Thus, removal of older vehicles is done to keep the 2001
and the 2009 NHTS data consistent. Finally, only those vehicles were analyzed that use gasoline.
16Assignments of gasoline prices were based on the variable Travel Day in the NHTS data-sets. During
the administration of the household recruitment interview, the Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing
(CATI) program randomly assigned a travel date to each household. The interviewer revealed the travel
date to the household respondent during the interview. Household travel days were assigned for all seven
days of the week, including all holidays. All household members who completed a household recruitment
interview were sent travel diaries for their travel day. NHTS also reports gasoline prices. These prices were
assigned based on the Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts (PADD) designation for a given NHTS
household. These districts are similar to Census regions in that each state is assigned to a given region, but
the regions are drawn up in such a way as to maximize gasoline distribution. ACCRA and NHTS gasoline
prices are highly correlated. I regressed ACCRA gasoline prices on NHTS gasoline prices and used predicted
gasoline prices for those NHTS MSAs, which could not be matched with ACCRA data.
17The US Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sponsor the website
www.fueleconomy.org, which contains ﬁles for city, highway and combined MPG by vehicles make, model
and year for automobiles sold in the US between 1985 - 2014.
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make, model and year and these variables were used to match the vehicle fuel economy with
the NHTS data.
Table 1 provides demographic statistics of household responses in the NHTS. The ﬁrst
column reports the descriptive statistics for the entire sample. This is broken down by
NHTS survey years in columns 2 and 3, respectively. Column 4 compares columns 2 and 3
and reports the diﬀerences and standard errors in parentheses. The null hypothesis that is
being tested in column 4 is that the variables do not diﬀer between 2001 and 2009. Between
2000 and 2009, average gasoline prices increased, average VMT declined and there was a
slight but signiﬁcant increase in average MPG.18 Figure 3 plots the distribution of annual
VMT and MPG for both surveys. The distributions of both these variables are quite similar
for the two surveys.
The average gasoline price in 2001 NHTS was $1.35 and the average gasoline price in
2009 was $3.17 in the sample. The standard deviations of gasoline prices in the data for 2001
and 2009 are 0.18 and 0.69, respectively. This reﬂects how variation in gasoline prices has
changed over the years. A prime reason for this is major ﬂuctuations in gasoline prices during
the period 2008-2009. Gasoline prices continued to increase during the ﬁrst two quarters of
2008 reaching a peak of $4.60 and then started to decline before escalating again in the
beginning of 2009.19 Panel A in Figure 4 shows the kernel densities of gasoline prices for
the two survey years. As highlighted earlier, there is more variation in gasoline prices in the
2008 - 2009 time frame relative to variation in gasoline prices in 2001-2002 period. Panel B
of Figure 4 plots average MSA gasoline prices in 2009 against average MSA gasoline prices
in 2001. The broken line splits the MSAs based on increases in gasoline prices between the
two years. For MSAs above the broken line, gasoline prices increased by more than a factor
18Combined unadjusted MPG is a weighted average based on the assumption that the automobile was
operated 55% under city driving conditions and 45% under highway conditions)
19This could also be due to diﬀerences in gasoline taxes between states. Some states have been reluctant
in changing gasoline taxes between 2001 and 2009, whereas others have been more frequent (Li et al. (2014)).
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Table 1: Demographic Statistics: 2001 & 2009 National Household Travel Survey
Panel A Full sample 2001 NHTS 2009 NHTS Diﬀerence
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Vehicle miles traveled
(VMT) in '000
10.160 11.244 9.974 -1.271***
(8.259) (8.881) (8.132) (0.045)
Combined unadjusted
fuel economy (MPG)
25.545 25.224 25.600 0.377***
(6.193) (5.296) (6.333) (0.028)
Gasoline price
2.902 1.350 3.168 1.818***
(0.906) (0.180) (0.687) (0.002)
Household size
2.648 2.847 2.614 -0.233***
(1.280) (1.370) (1.260) (0.007)
Number of workers in
household
1.218 1.579 1.156 -0.424***
(0.970) (1.011) (0.949) (0.005)
Number of adults
2.090 2.112 2.087 -0.026***
(0.713) (0.743) (0.708) (0.004)
Fraction of children
0.133 0.175 0.126 -0.049***
(0.212) (0.231) (0.208) (0.001)
Fraction of women
0.520 0.510 0.522 0.013***
(0.229) (0.233) (0.228) (0.001)
Panel B
Distribution of
household
characteristics
Percentage
Household income
<$25,000
13.64 16.16 13.20
Household income
<$50,000 and ≥$25,000
26.20 32.35 25.14
Household income
<$75,000 and ≥$50,000
19.96 21.66 19.67
Household income ≥
$75,000
40.20 29.84 41.99
White, only 87.93 84.90 88.45
African-American, only 4.92 5.02 4.90
Asian, only 2.02 1.86 2.04
Number of households 161,349 23,739 137,610
Notes: The main entries in columns 1, 2 and 3 report the mean level of the variables with standard
deviations in parentheses. Panel A, column 1 reports the means and standard deviations for the
whole sample. Columns 2 and 3 of Panel A show the means and standard deviations for the two
survey years. In column 4, the null hypothesis that is being tested is that the values in columns 2
and 3 are not diﬀerent from zero. Diﬀerences with standard errors in parentheses are reported in
column 4. In Panel B, column 1 distribution of certain household characteristics are displayed for
the whole sample. Panel B, columns 2 and 3 report these household characteristics by survey year.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. * Signiﬁcant at the 10
percent level.
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of two; and vice versa for MSAs below the broken line. The results of all the models shown
in Section III will now be discussed.
V. How big is the matching eﬀect?
Main results
This section examines the results of the models discussed in Section III. A basic check for the
matching eﬀect is running a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Ordinary Least Squares
(DDD-OLS) approach given by equation (5). Table 2 shows the results of this model under
diﬀerent speciﬁcations. In the ﬁrst column of Table 2, only the main eﬀects of VMT and
gasoline prices are included as well as their interaction. The interaction between VMT and
gasoline prices represents the matching eﬀect. Time dummies are included in the second
column. These time dummies control for time varying unobservables between the survey
years. These could include technological changes, changes in lifestyle and preferences or
residential dispersions. MSA ﬁxed eﬀects are added in the third column. These ﬁxed eﬀects
control for time invariant city speciﬁc unobservables. MPG of a vehicle is also dependent
on certain household and geographical characteristics. These household characteristics are
included in the fourth speciﬁcation. These controls include number of household members,
number of adults in the households, number of workers in the household, the fraction of
children (age <18) and women in the household, and household income quartiles. Finally,
the last column adds interactions between these demographics and gasoline price to the
previous speciﬁcation. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. For all these
regressions, the matching eﬀect is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. This implies that as
gasoline prices increase, households that drive more are driving a more fuel eﬃcient vehicle
relative to households that drive less. The results of Table 2 indicate that for a $1 increase
in gasoline prices, when VMT increases by 1000 annual miles, MPG increases on average by
0.02.
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Figure 4: MSA 2009 gasoline prices v. 2001 gasoline prices
Notes: The graph in Panel A shows the kernel densities of gasoline prices for the 2001 and the 2009
ACCRA gasoline prices. The 2001 price distribution is shown by the solid line and the 2009 price
distribution is shown by the broken line. Panel B plots 2009 average MSA gasoline prices against
2001 average MSA gasoline prices. For MSAs above the broken line, gasoline prices increased by
more than a factor of two. For those below the broken line, gasoline prices increased by less than a
factor of two.
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Table 2: Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Ordinary Least Squares (DDD - OLS) results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pricegas
0.027 0.251*** -0.091*** -0.100*** -0.128*
(0.019) (0.028) (0.033) (0.035) (0.078)
VMT
-0.035*** -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.023*** -0.023***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Matching
eﬀect
0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Year FE X X X X
MSA FE X X X
Demographic
controls
X X
Pricegas×Demographic
controls
X
N = 307,977 307,977 304,903 284,605 284,605
R2 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.016 0.016
Notes: The estimates reported in columns 1-5 are associated with the coeﬃcients estimates from
the DDD-OLS model represented by equation (6). The ﬁrst column shows the results of the basic
DDD-OLS model. Year dummies are added in column 2, MSA ﬁxed eﬀects are included in column
3, demographic controls are added in column 4 and the interactions of these demographics with
gasoline prices are added in column 5. Demographic controls are number of household members,
number of adults in the households, number of workers in the household, the fraction of children
(age <18) and women in the household and household income quartile. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. The unit of observation is vehicle.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. * Signiﬁcant at the 10
percent level.
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A potential issue with the simple DDD-OLS model is that VMT is endogenous to MPG.
It is expected that VMT aﬀects the MPG of the chosen car but there is also a greater
likelihood that households with more fuel eﬃcient vehicles drive more. Increase in fuel ef-
ﬁciency decreases the cost of driving and hence households could drive more. Therefore,
VMT and the interaction term in the above equation are not exogenous. To overcome this
simultaneity problem, I use an instrumental variables strategy. One strategy is to use the
interactions of demographics with gasoline prices as instruments for VMT. This is repre-
sented by the model shown by equations (6) and (7). The interaction of household income
quartile, number of household members, number of adults, number of workers, and fraction
of children and women in the household with gasoline prices serve as instruments for VMT
and [VMT×Pricegas]. These variables were selected based on the household determinants
of VMT established by the previous literature (Bento et al. (2009), Small and van Dender
(2007), Li et al. (2012)).
Table 3 shows the results with robust standard errors of the second stage of Diﬀerence-in-
Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Two-Stages Least Squares (DDD-2SLS) model. In this model the
interactions of household characteristics with gasoline prices enter linearly as instruments in
the ﬁrst stage. The second-stage of this model is represented by equation (7). Besides the
predicted interaction term, the only controls in the ﬁrst column of Table 3 are gasoline prices,
predicted VMT and demographics. These predictions were made using the results of the ﬁrst
stage. Time dummies and MSA ﬁxed eﬀects are added successively to the columns 2 and
3. Under all speciﬁcations the matching eﬀect is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. The
matching eﬀect coeﬃcient decreases in the ﬁrst column indicating the potential endogeneity
embedded in the simple DDD-OLS estimates. This also implies that households drive more
particularly, if they reside in low gasoline price regimes.20 The eﬀect in Table 3 ranges from
0.012 to 0.022. For a $1 increase in gasoline prices, when a vehicle is driven 1000 additional
20Also note that the VMT coeﬃcients have become more negative compared to the DDD-OLS results.
This also suggests that the DDD-OLS results probably suﬀer from VMT being endogenous to MPG.
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Table 3: Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences w/ linear instruments (DDD - 2SLS)  2nd
stage results
(1) (2) (3)
Pricegas
0.053 0.296*** -0.152**
(0.069) (0.078) (0.074)
VMT
-0.182** -0.358*** -0.410***
(0.018) (0.095) (0.086)
Matching
eﬀect
0.012** 0.016*** 0.022***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Year FE X X
MSA FE X
Demographic
controls
X X X
Pricegas×Other
controls
Instr. Instr. Instr.
N = 287,463 287,463 287,463
F-statistics of excluded instruments
VMT 10.90 9.54 9.60
VMT×Pricegas 315.22 314.94 315.02
Notes: The estimates reported in columns 1-3 are associated with the coeﬃcients estimates from
the second stage of the model represented by equation (7). Household characteristics and the
interactions between these characteristics and gasoline prices serve as instruments. These household
characteristics include the number of household members, number of adults in the households,
number of workers in the household, the fraction of children (age <18) and women in the household
and household income quartile. The ﬁrst column shows the results without any additional controls.
Year dummies are added in column 2 and MSA ﬁxed eﬀects are included in column 3. Demographic
controls are number of household members, number of adults in the households, number of workers
in the household, fraction of children (age <18) and women in the household and household income
quartile. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The unit of observation is vehicle.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. * Signiﬁcant at the 10
percent level.
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Table 4: Summary statistics for V̂MT
Mean Standard
deviation
Correlation w/
reported VMT
Reported VMT 10.160 8.239 1.000
VMT = f(Pricegas, year
dummies)
10.165 0.377 0.055
VMT = f(Pricegas, year
dummies, X)
10.258 2.076 0.251
VMT e = f(Pricegas, year
dummies, X, MSA
dummies)
10.252 2.132 0.253
Notes: The correlation between the reported VMT and the predicted VMT are reported here.
Predicted VMT is obtained by ﬁrst running the OLS regression on equation (6) and then using the
respective coeﬃcients, predict VMT at average gasoline prices and the interaction of these average
prices with number of household members, number of adults in the households, number of workers
in the household, fraction of children (age <18) and women in the household and household income
quartile. The matrix X contains the demographic variables that determine predicted VMT: number
of household members, number of adults in the households, number of workers in the household,
fraction of children (age <18) and women in the household and household income quartile and the
interactions of these variables with average gasoline prices.
annual miles relative to others, this particular vehicle provides on average 0.02 more MPG.
Compared to the DDD-OLS model, the matching coeﬃcient estimates of Table 3 are similar
in magnitude.
However, an issue with this approach is that the interactions of household characteristics
with gasoline prices do not enter the second stage. This is because these interactions serve
as instruments and inclusion of these variables will make the DDD-2SLS model unidentiﬁed.
Inclusion of these instruments will cause the number of instruments to be less than the num-
ber of endogenous components. Inability to include these variables and their interactions will
result in inability to capture certain household heterogeneous eﬀects on MPG. To overcome
this problem, I predict the eﬀect of gasoline prices on MPG for diﬀerent households and
then regress these predicted eﬀects on predicted VMT. To execute this I follow a two-step
procedure. In the ﬁrst step, estimate equation (6) by OLS and predict VMT at average
gasoline prices. Note, gasoline prices enter equation (6) as a main eﬀect and are also inter-
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acted with households characteristics.21 The third column of Table 4 shows the correlations
between the reported VMT and the predicted VMT. Considering VMT to be a function of
average gasoline prices, household characteristics and the interaction of these characteristics
with average gasoline prices, year dummies and MSA dummies, the correlation coeﬃcient
between actual and predicted values is 0.25. In the second step, estimate equation (11) by
OLS and correct the standard errors.
The results of equation (11) with corrected standard errors are shown in Table 5.22 The
ﬁrst column shows the results of a regression of MPG on gasoline prices and the interaction
of gasoline prices with predicted VMT. Time dummies and MSA ﬁxed eﬀects are added
in the second and the third column, respectively. Other demographics are inserted for the
estimation of equation (11) given by speciﬁcation of column four. In all these regressions
the matching eﬀect is signiﬁcant. Inclusion of additional controls makes the matching eﬀect
positive. The magnitude of the eﬀect is closer to the DDD-OLS results. These results
lend support to the fact that controlling for heterogeneous household eﬀects is essential to
grasp the true matching eﬀect. In the last three columns predicted VMT is included in the
regressions instead of the household characteristics. These particular regressions, due to the
inclusion of predicted VMT, are a functional form constraints of the DDD-OLS model. Again
after the inclusion of V̂MT instead of reported VMT, the magnitude of the matching eﬀect
is centered around the basic DDD-OLS results. According to these results when gasoline
prices increase by $1 and household driving increases by 1000 annual miles, these households
on average adopt a vehicle that accords 0.015 - 0.021 more MPG.
This particular method gives the correlation between the treatment eﬀect of dPricegas
and predicted VMT propensity. To get a causal matching eﬀect and be able to control for
heterogeneous household eﬀects on MPG, I create instruments using Bento et al. (2009)
21These household characteristics are the same as those that were used as instruments in the DID-IV given
by equations (6) and (7). These are number of household members, number of workers in the households,
income quartiles, number of adults in the household, and fraction of women and children in the house.
22Since predicted VMT enters equation (11), standard errors have to be corrected.
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structural model. The details of this methodology are given by equations (14) and (15).
This particular instrument is a function of number of household members, household income
quartile, number of children and women in the household, household age distribution, number
of adults in the households, and vehicle class, vehicle age and driving cost per mile of the
average vehicle. The ﬁrst stage results for VMT are displayed in Table 6.23 In the ﬁrst
column of Table 6 only gasoline prices and the instrument were included. Time dummies and
MSA ﬁxed eﬀects are included in the second and third columns. Finally, other demographic
controls and the interactions of these controls with gasoline prices are added in the last two
columns. These demographic controls include all the demographic controls of the DDD-
OLS model. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all these models, the
coeﬃcient associated with gasoline prices is negative and statistically signiﬁcant (except
for column three, where it is insigniﬁcant). This implies that as gasoline prices increase
households drive less and hence satisfying the law of demand. The F-statistic of the excluded
instruments is signiﬁcant in all these ﬁrst-stage speciﬁcations. The values of the ﬁrst stage
F-statistics indicate that the instruments are not weak based on the critical values suggested
by Stock and Yogo (2005).
Table 7 shows the results with robust standard errors of the second stage of the DDD-
2SLS model given by equation (15). The diﬀerence between this model and the model given
by (7) is that here VMT is a non-linear function of household characteristics derived from
a structural model. An advantage of this method is that the interactions of the household
characteristics with gasoline prices can be included in the second stage. The only controls
in the ﬁrst column of Table 7 are gasoline prices and the predicted VMT besides the pre-
dicted interaction term. These predictions were made using the results of the ﬁrst stage.
Time dummies, MSA ﬁxed eﬀects, demographic controls and the interaction of these demo-
graphics with gasoline prices are added successively to the later columns. The demographic
23There are two endogenous variables. VMT and since VMT is also interacted with gasoline prices, VMT
× Pricegas is also endogenous. The ﬁrst stage results of VMT ×Pricegas not shown here but can be provided
upon request.
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Table 6: Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences w/ non-linear instruments (DDD - 2SLS) 
1st stage for VMT results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pricegas -0.330*** -0.158*** -0.021 -0.053 -0.393***
(0.023) (0.037) (0.039) (0.038) (0.0894)
V̂ MTij¯ 0.252*** 0.256*** 0.247*** 0.078*** 0.100***
(0.027) (0.026) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025)
V̂ MTij¯ ×Pricegas 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.070*** 0.008 -0.000
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
YEAR FE X X X X
MSA FE X X X
Demographic
controls
X X
Pricegas×Demographic
controls
X
F-statistic of
excluded
instruments
1075.46 1096.83 1546.69 67.52 67.98
N = 247,850 247,850 247,850 247,850 247,850
Notes: The estimates reported in columns 1-5 are associated with coeﬃcients estimates from the
ﬁrst stage of the model represented by equation (15). V̂ MT ij¯ serves as the instrument for VMT.
V̂ MT ij¯ is estimated using Bento et al. (2009) structural model. The instrument is a function of
household income, number of household members, number of children and women in the household,
household age distribution, number of adults in the households, and vehicle class, vehicle age and
driving cost per mile of the average vehicle in the sample. The ﬁrst column shows the results of
the basic DID-IV model. Year dummies are added in column 2, MSA ﬁxed eﬀects are included in
column 3, demographic controls are added in column 4 and interactions of these demographics with
gasoline prices are added in column 5. Demographic controls are number of household members,
number of adults in the households, number of workers in the household, fraction of children (age
<18) and women in the household and household income quartile. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. The unit of observation is vehicle.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. * Signiﬁcant at the 10
percent level.
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controls now include all the demographic controls of the baseline DDD-OLS model. Un-
der all speciﬁcations the matching eﬀect is positive and statistically signiﬁcant (except for
speciﬁcation given by columns 1 and 2, where the matching eﬀect is insigniﬁcant). Again
the matching coeﬃcient is smaller in magnitude in the ﬁrst column relative to the DDD-
OLS results. Hence, compared to the DDD-OLS model and the 2SLS results, it could be
claimed that due to the endogeneity of VMT to MPG, the matching eﬀect results given by
the DDD-OLS model are probably biased upwards.The eﬀect ranges from 0.04 to 0.13. For
a $1 increase in gasoline prices, a household that drives 1000 more annual miles per vehicle
relative to others is driving a vehicle that provides on average 0.04 - 0.13 more MPG.
Other results
Thus far, I have estimated the matching eﬀect for all vehicles in the household. To study
the robustness of the results the data is restricted to the top-n household vehicles. Top
orders household automobiles by VMT. In Table 8, n ≤ number of adults in the household.
In Table 9 this restriction is made more stringent and n = 1, that is, the most utilized
household vehicle is retained in the data. These tables show the results of the restricted
data for all the models. The 1st column shows the DDD-OLS results controlling for the
demographic covariates, interactions of these variables with gasoline prices, year dummies
and MSA ﬁxed eﬀects. These results are comparable with Table 2, Column 5. The match-
ing coeﬃcient estimate is slightly smaller than the previous DDD-OLS result but is still
signiﬁcant. Columns 2 in these tables use the interactions of demographics with gasoline
prices as instruments. These results could be compared with Table 3, Column 3. Again
the results are consistent with the main results. Columns 3 and 4 show the results of the
non-causal estimation procedure given by equation (11) for the top-n automobiles in the
households. This particular regression estimates how the the heterogeneous eﬀects on MPG,
due to changes in gasoline prices are correlated with predicted VMT. In column 3, covari-
ates include household demographics and year dummies. In column 4 predicted VMT is
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Table 7: Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences w/ non-linear instruments (DDD - 2SLS) 
2nd stage results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pricegas
0.021 0.264* -0.316** -0.364** -0.914*
(0.158) (0.153) (0.161) (0.170) (0.507)
V̂ MTij¯
-0.108*** -0.115*** -0.250*** -0.212*** -0.006
(0.043) (0.043) (0.046) (0.081) (0.185)
Matching
eﬀect
0.014 0.016 0.038*** 0.045*** 0.127**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.066)
Year FE X X X X
MSA FE X X X
Demographic
controls
X X
Pricegas×Demographic
controls
X
N = 247,850 247,850 247,850 247,850 247,850
F-statistics of excluded instruments
VMT 1075.46 1096.83 1546.69 67.52 67.98
VMT×Pricegas 1044.10 1058.39 1568.65 188.89 58.05
Notes: The estimates reported in columns 1-5 are associated with coeﬃcients estimates from the
second stage of the model represented by equation (16). V̂ MT ij¯ct serves as the instrument for VMT.
V̂ MT ij¯ct is estimated using Bento et al. (2009) structural model. The instrument is a function of
household income, number of household members, number of children and women in the household,
household age distribution, number of adults in the households, and vehicle class, vehicle age and
driving cost per mile of the average vehicle in the sample. The ﬁrst column shows the results without
any additional controls. Year dummies are added in column 2, MSA ﬁxed eﬀects are included in
column 3, demographic controls are added in column 4 and interactions of these demographics with
gasoline prices are added in column 5. Demographic controls are number of household members,
number of adults in the households, number of workers in the household, fraction of children (age
<18) and women in the household and household income quartile. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. The unit of observation is vehicle.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. * Signiﬁcant at the 10
percent level.
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included in the model. These results are similar to those displayed in Table 5. Finally, the
last two columns of Table 8 and Table 9 show the results when V̂ MTij¯ and V̂ MTij¯×Pricegas
are used as instruments for reported VMT and the matching eﬀect. V̂ MTij¯ is a non-linear
function of VMT and is calculated using Bento et al.'s (2009) structural model. Household
demographics are controlled for in column 5 and the interactions of these demographics with
gasoline prices are added to the model in column 6. The matching eﬀect is signiﬁcant in
column 5 whereas it is insigniﬁcant in column 6. The insigniﬁcance in the last column is
driven mainly by the interaction between gasoline prices and income quartiles. Moreover,
the F-statistics of the excluded instruments are quite close to the critical values suggested
by Stock and Yogo (2005). The magnitudes of the results, however, are similar to the results
reported in Table 7.
Table 10 replicates the main results with gallons per mile as the dependent variable. The
coeﬃcient estimates indicate the change in gasoline consumption (in gallons) when there is a
small change in the explanatory variables. The matching eﬀect is negative for all the models
implying that when gasoline prices increase by $1, a household that drives 1000 more annual
miles is driving a vehicle that consumes less gasoline. Except for the non-causal models, the
coeﬃcient of interest is signiﬁcant.
The unit of observations for all the results is vehicle. Therefore, the results exploit
between as well as within household variation in MPG. However, this strategy also implicitly
assumes that household i's vehicle j's MPG is independent of household i's vehicle k's
MPG.24 To estimate the matching eﬀect between households, I regress weighted-MPG on∑
j VMTij
# of adults
. Weighted-MPG is equal to
∑
wijMPGj where wij are weights and wij =
VMTij∑
j VMTij
for each household. Table 11 shows the results of this strategy for all the econometric
24In estimation of the rebound eﬀect Linn (2013) is one of the few studies that does not make the
assumption that VMT for vehicle j is independent of vehicle k. To overcome this he controls for fuel
economy of the other vehicles in the household in their econometric models.
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methods.25 The results are robust and signiﬁcant for most of the models. The magnitude of
the matching eﬀect increases when the endogeneity issue is taken care of in columns 2 to 6.
The insigniﬁcance in the last column is driven mainly by the interaction between gasoline
prices and the income quartiles.
Implications
Given the econometric models, the change in household fuel economy due to a small change
in gasoline prices is given by ∂MPGj/∂P gas = β + θVMTj. β represents the change in fuel
economy from the compositional eﬀect and θ measures the change in household's vehicle
choice given household's VMT demand. Both these eﬀects result in gasoline savings. The
proportion of the change in gasoline consumption through the matching channel can be
measured by equation (16).
4 in gasoline consumption
due to the matching effect
= 1−
∑j V MTjMPGj+β̂+θ̂·VMT − VMTjMPGj∑
j
V MTj
MPGj+β̂+θ̂·VMTj −
VMTj
MPGj
 (16)
where β̂ and θ̂ are the parameters estimated by the methods explained in Section III,
VMTj
MPGj
measures the gasoline consumption of vehicle j and VMT is the average VMT.
In equation (16), β̂ + θ̂ · VMT predicts the average change in MPG due to an increase
in gasoline prices. The numerator captures the change in gasoline consumption if each
household's fuel economy is increased by this average change and thus measures the change in
gasoline consumption via the compositional eﬀect. On the other hand, β̂+ θ̂ ·VMTj predicts
the change in fuel economy for each vehicle when gasoline prices increase and thus, the
denominator estimates the change in gasoline consumption through both the matching and
the compositional eﬀects (total eﬀect). Hence, the proportion of gasoline savings explained
by the matching eﬀect is given by (16). Given the econometric model choice, the matching
25These results are not comparable with the previous results as these only exploit variation in weighted-
MPG between households.
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Table 12: Gasoline savings in 2009 due to the matching and the compositional eﬀects
+$0.25 +$0.55 +$1.00 +$4.00
DDD-OLS
Savings via 4 in composition +
matching
5.3% 5.5% 5.8% 7.7%
Savings via 4 in matching 3.6% 3.7% 3.9% 5.1%
DDD-2SLS (linear IVs)
Savings via 4 in composition +
matching
1.2% 1.5% 1.9% 4.6%
Savings via 4 in matching 0.8% 1.0% 1.3% 3.1%
Non-causal estimation
Savings via 4 in composition +
matching
4.5% 4.8% 5.1% 7.1%
Savings via 4 in matching 2.4% 2.6% 2.7% 3.8%
DDD-2SLS (non-linear IVs)
Savings via 4 in composition +
matching
9.1% 10.4% 12.1% 21.1%
Savings via 4 in matching 6.0% 6.9% 8.0% 13.9%
Notes: This table shows the percentage reduction in gasoline consumption via the ∂MPGj/∂P gas
channel when gasoline prices increase. Four diﬀerent scenarios are considered: +$0.25, +$0.55,
+$1.00 and +$4.00. The reduction in savings depends on the econometric model choice and the
estimates of the coeﬃcients under these models. The matching eﬀect is responsible for 54% to 67%
of these savings.
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eﬀect explains 1
2
to 2
3
of the change in gasoline consumption when compared to the total
eﬀect.
Table 12 compares gasoline savings via ∂MPGj/∂P gas channels for diﬀerent hypothetical
gasoline tax regimes in 2009. These are increase in gasoline prices of $0.25 (small increase
in prices), $0.55 which is the increase needed to attain the welfare maximizing level (see
Parry and Small (2005), $1 and $4. The last two are larger increases that will put the US in
conjunction with the gasoline taxes enforced in Europe.26 For example, if gasoline prices in
2009 were $1 higher, gasoline consumption would have been 2% to 12% lower.27 Depending
on the econometric model choice and the respective coeﬃcient estimates, assortative match-
ing decreases gasoline consumption by 1.3% to 8.1%. If in 2009, the gasoline tax in the US
was on par with the European counterparts, gasoline consumption would have been 5% to
21% lower and 54% to 67% of these reductions in consumption could be attributed to the
matching eﬀect while the remainder would be due to the compositional eﬀect. Figure 5 plots
MPG against VMT for these hypothetical 2009 tax regimes. More matching is observed as
gasoline prices increase. Given that annual gasoline consumption for light-duty vehicles in
the US in 2009 was 138 billion gallons, if average gasoline tax in the US was at the welfare
maximizing level (an increase in gasoline prices by $0.55 as suggested by Parry and Small
(2005)), gasoline consumption would have been 2.1 to 14.3 billion gallons less.28 Each gal-
lon of gasoline produces 20 pounds of CO2 when burned, and hence from an environmental
perspective these savings imply a reduction in GHG emissions by 14 to 97 million tons via
the matching channel.29
26As of 2015, gasoline taxes in Germany and the UK are $4.10 and $3.95 per gallon, respectively.
27Note, in making these calculations, I keep the household VMT demand constant when gasoline prices
change. The utilization eﬀect will accrue even further gasoline savings.
28Annual gasoline consumption data can be found at the US department of Energy, Earth Policy Institute
website.
29A gallon of gasoline weighs about 6.3 pounds, of which 87% is carbon and 13% is hydrogen and therefore
carbon in a gallon of gasoline weighs 5.5 pounds. But most of the weight of CO2 is produced by oxygen in
the air. When gasoline is burned, hydrogen and carbon are separated and carbon interacts with oxygen to
produce CO2. A carbon atom has an atomic weight of 12 and an oxygen atom has an atomic weight of 16;
thus each molecule of CO2 has an atomic weight of 44. Therefore, the amount of CO2 produced by a gallon
of gasoline is 44/12× 5.5 = 20 pounds of CO2.
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Figure 5: MPG - VMT relationship for diﬀerent tax regimes (Year = 2009)
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Figure 5 (continued): MPG - VMT relationship for diﬀerent tax regimes (Year = 2009)
Notes: In the graphs above predicted fuel economies under diﬀerent tax regimes are plotted against
reported annual miles from the NHTS 2009 conﬁdential survey ﬁles. Four diﬀerent tax regimes
are considered: +$0.25, +$0.55, +$1.00 and +$4.00 and these are compared with the case where
gasoline prices are unaltered.
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VI. Conclusion
Combustion of gasoline has detrimental environmental and health impacts. To reduce these
externalities, policies are introduced to inﬂuence gasoline prices. Two eﬀects of gasoline
prices have been identiﬁed in the literature: (i) the utilization eﬀect and (ii) the composi-
tional eﬀect. The former implies that an increase in gasoline prices results in a decrease in
the demand for VMT through the direct eﬀect of reduction in gasoline consumption. The
latter suggests that due to higher gasoline prices, there is an evolution of ﬂeet towards fuel
eﬃciency. There is a potential third eﬀect of gasoline prices that has been overlooked in
the previous studies. Due to heterogeneity in demand for VMT, increase in gasoline prices
should particularly aﬀect vehicle choices of households that drive more. In the presence of
higher gasoline prices, the costs borne by high-VMT households is greater and hence they
are more likely to adopt a fuel eﬃcient vehicle. In equilibrium, there will be matching of fuel
eﬃciency among high-VMT households and fuel ineﬃciency among low-VMT households.
This is the ﬁrst study that analyzes such assortative behavior.
To embrace the importance of the matching eﬀect, if fuel economy was assigned perfectly
to households based on their VMT demand, this particular eﬀect could have saved 15% of
US gasoline consumption. The study exploits variation in gasoline prices in the last decade
and based on household VMT demand scrutinizes how these prices aﬀect vehicle choice.
For this, I use the conﬁdential 2001 and the 2009 NHTS data, the American Chamber
of Commerce ACCRA Cost of Living Index (COLI) database and the fuel economy data
from the Department of Energy to produce a unique data-set. A variety of econometric
methods are employed to estimate the matching eﬀect. The results suggest that when the
gasoline price increases by $1, a vehicle that is driven 1000 more annual miles per vehicle, on
average gives 0.02 to 0.13 more miles per gallon. These results are robust to diﬀerent model
speciﬁcations.
Given the coeﬃcient estimates, if gasoline prices in 2009 were $1 higher, gasoline con-
sumption would have been 1% to 8% lower due to the matching eﬀect. These additional
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beneﬁts of higher prices further favor price-based policies. The obvious strategy is increasing
federal and state gasoline taxes. Given the societal costs of gasoline consumption, gasoline
taxes in the US are well below the welfare maximizing level. Supply side policies such as
restrictions on local oil production, more stringent renewable fuel standards and other en-
vironmental regulations (for example Tier 3 regulations) or abatement of crude oil imports
through quotas or tariﬀs would also aﬀect prices positively.30
30Currently, the Congress has imposed a ban on oil exploration and extraction along the eastern Gulf of
Mexico and the Atlantic and Paciﬁc coastlines. The Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) program created in
2005, requires reﬁneries to blend ethanol into gasoline. According to the Congressional Budget Oﬃce 2014
report, such standards could increase gasoline prices by 4% to 9% (13¢ to 26¢). The EPA has approved Tier 3
gasoline regulations, which aim at reducing sulfur concentration in gasoline. Due to additional manufacturing
and compliance costs of these regulations, gasoline prices are expected to increase.
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Chapter 2: Evaluating the eﬀectiveness of an environmental
disclosure policy: an application to New South Wales
I. Introduction
Policy-makers have introduced a variety of instruments (environmental standards, emissions
taxes, emissions permits markets) to curb industrial air emissions.31 One such policy is the
disclosure of environmental information. The main purpose of introducing environmental
information disclosure policies is to reduce informational asymmetries and put, if necessary,
pressure on ﬁrms to reduce emissions. Perhaps the most well-known example of such a
strategy is the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), ﬁrst employed in the US in 1985 and later
incorporated into the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990.32 Other countries and regions have
followed the US in this regard and have made disclosure of environmental information part
of their laws. It became part of the European Union Constitution in 2002 when the Aarhus
Convention was ratiﬁed in Denmark to incorporate the new strategy.33 The British Compa-
nies Act of 2006 requires companies listed on the London Stock Exchange to report in their
annual Business Review the impact they have on the environment. In 2008, Buenos Aires
City Council passed Law # 2598 requiring all ﬁrms that employ more than three-hundred
workers to create annual sustainability reports that should be available to the public.34 Sev-
eral stock exchange markets (Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), Bursa Malaysia, Bovespa
31For more on these and others see Sterner (2002), Goulder and Parry (2008), and Banzhaf (2012).
32TRI was introduced after considering the negative impacts of the toxic releases in the 1984 Bhopal
disaster. Under the TRI, 18,500 companies reported 10.4 billion pounds of toxic chemicals released in 1987.
In 2005, 23,461 companies reported 4.34 billion pounds of chemicals released in the air; a decline of 54%.
However, the rate of reduction in emissions has declined relative to the initial years when the program started.
Between 1988 and 1993 there was a reduction in toxic releases by 37%, whereas toxic releases declined by
only 10% between 1993 and 1998. Studies evaluating eﬀectiveness of TRI as a policy tool have produced
mixed results (see Bui and Mayer (2003) and Oberholzer-Gee and Mitsunari (2006)).
33Under the Article 2(2)d of the Aarhus Convention, the public (individuals and associations) has the right
to environmental information. Public authorities are obliged to provide environmental information that is
in their possession. Access to environmental information follows from the ﬁrst EU Directive on the Freedom
of Access to Information on the Environment, the ECE Guidelines on Access to Environmental Information
and the Public Participation in Environmental Decision Making of 1995 and the Rio Declaration of 1992.
34Firms in Buenos Aires have to comply with the Ethos Principle at the minimum but are encouraged
to use Global Reporting Initiative's G3 guidelines when making their reports. For more on this see The
International Corporate Sustainability Reporting Site.
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and the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange) have also introduced measures to enhance environmental
information disclosure.35 These measures have been implanted to increase corporate social
responsibilities, with respect to the environment in particular. This paper studies the im-
pact on air pollution of an environmental disclosure policy that was recently implemented
in New South Wales (NSW), Australia. Starting from July 1st, 2012 all ﬁrms holding an
Environmental Protection License (EPL) in NSW are required to provide public access to
emissions monitoring data. This is part of NSW's Protection of the Environment Legislation
Amendment Act of 2011. To analyze the inﬂuence of this new policy, this paper focuses on
the two largest cities in NSW: Sydney and Newcastle.
Previous studies have shown the eﬀects of environmental information disclosure policies
on various outcomes that are indirectly related to environmental quality (ﬁnancial perfor-
mance, environmental injustice, investor behavior, political activism, distribution of housing
prices, etc).36 Perlin et al. (1995) study how eﬀective TRI has been in reducing environmen-
tal injustice. Their results show that TRI has not been inﬂuential in terms of aﬀecting the
distribution of environmental justice in the US. In 1990, besides Native Americans, minority
groups continued to inhabit more polluted regions relative to whites. Bui and Mayer (2003)
ﬁnd that TRI has no impact on political activism or the distribution of housing prices and
advocates for the traditional command-and-control policies. Bui (2005) report that the ef-
fects of TRI in reducing emissions are overstated, and it could be that the policy has merely
led to substitution to other chemicals that are not necessarily less toxic. Foulon et al. (2001)
examines the impacts of traditional policies (ﬁnes and penalties) and information disclosure
strategies on ﬁrm behavior. They studied ﬁfteen plants in the pulp and paper industry be-
tween 1987 and 1996 in British Columbia, Canada. They ﬁnd that information disclosure
35Since 2005, Bovespa has been creating a Corporate Sustainability Index in which company stocks are
ranked according to sustainability and social responsibility. Similarly in 2004, JSE started producing socially
responsible investment (SRI) indices. In the US, Securities and Exchange Commission sometimes requires
disclosure of hazardous waste materials. For more on these see Lydenberg and Grace (2008).
36Hamilton (1995) shows that TRI does aﬀect the behavior of investors and third parties (journalists
in their study). Firms that reported higher pollutant emissions, land releases, underground injections, and
waste shipped oﬀ-site or chemical submissions were more likely to be covered by journalists. Companies that
reported information prior to the introduction of TRI were least likely to receive coverage from journalists.
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provided additional and stronger incentives for ﬁrms to reduce pollution. However, very little
work has been done with regards to the eﬀects of such policies on environmental quality.
The main purpose of this paper is estimate the impact of an environmental disclosure
policy on air pollution. The identiﬁcation assumption of the study is that there should be a
discontinuity in the pollution measure on the date the environmental information disclosure
policy is enforced. This assumption implies that in the absence of the policy, air pollution
would have changed continuously on July 1st, 2012. To exploit the exogenous shock produced
by the policy, a regression discontinuity design is employed. The beneﬁt of such an approach
is that the coeﬃcients can be interpreted causally. A requirement for such a methodology,
however, is availability of high-frequency data. Fortunately, such data is reported before and
after the policy implementation date for NSW.
Air pollution created by industrial activities could be in the form of gases (nitrogen oxides
(NOx), sulfur oxides (SOx), carbon monoxide (CO)) or solid particles (particulate matter
(PM10 and PM2.5)). Interactions of these pollutants could create additional pollutants. For
instance, ground level ozone (O3) is produced when NOx, CO and volatile organic compounds
(VOCs) react in the presence of sunlight and heat. Air pollution is a major concern today,
particularly in urban centers. Inhaling unclean air mainly aﬀects the body's respiratory and
the cardiovascular systems and these eﬀects are more prominent among children. Eﬀects of
air quality on health and productivity have been documented in numerous studies (Chay
and Greenstone (2003) and Currie et al. (2014)).37 Furthermore, air pollution also damages
ecological resources (water and soil quality, plants and animals). The total social costs
of air pollution are possibly quite large when one also accounts for household behavioral
adjustments to minimize exposure to pollution.38
37Chay and Greenstone (2003) exploit variation produced by the 1982-84 recession to show a positive
causal relationship between exposure to particulate matter and infant mortality. Currie et al. (2014)
summarize literature on how exposure to pollution during childhood aﬀects adult outcomes.
38Mu and Zhang (2014) report increases in investments in face-masks as air pollution intensiﬁes in China.
Defensive investments could also include sorting into neighborhoods with cleaner air (Banzhaf and Walsh,
2008) or expenditures on medicines (Deschenes et al. 2012)).
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Figure 6: Air quality in New South Wales (2011-2013)
Notes: These charts display the pollutant concentration levels in Sydney (a) and Newcastle (b) for
the years 2011 - 2013. The pollutants displayed are NO2, CO, PM10, PM2.5 and O3. The broken
red line represents the date when the information disclosure policy went into eﬀect.
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Figures 6a and 6b plot the average daily pollutant levels for Sydney and Newcastle
respectively, for the years 2011-2013. Pollutants shown in Figure 6 are: NO2, CO, PM10,
PM2.5 and O3. The broken line indicates the date (July 1
st, 2012), when the policy went into
eﬀect. No distinguishable pattern can be ascertained by looking at the distribution of these
pollutants. Moreover, using ocular methods a break in air pollutant levels on July 1st, 2012
is hard to detect. Similarly, the discontinuity based results indicate that the information
disclosure policy had negligible eﬀects on the pollutant concentration levels in these two
cities. These results are robust to diﬀerent model speciﬁcations. There could be a number
of reasons for these insigniﬁcant results. Air pollution levels in Australian cities is quite
low when compared to other developed cities. This could be due to stringent environmental
policies already enforced before the realization of this particular policy. It could also be
that environmental information might not be asymmetrical between ﬁrms and households in
NSW before the policy went into eﬀect. These probably did not necessitate any action from
the public to curb emissions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II provides a brief description of
the new policy in NSW, Section III describes the data and the econometric methodologies,
Section IV provides the results and Section V concludes.
II. Information disclosure policy in New South Wales
As part of the New SouthWales (NSW) government's commitment to revitalize and strengthen
the Environmental Protection Agency, the province has developed a new strategy. Starting
from 1st of July, 2012 all holders of Environmental Protection Licenses (EPLs) in NSW are
required to provide public access to monitoring data recorded under each EPL that they hold.
In NSW, there are two types of ﬁrms: industrial (EPA Licensed) and commercial (non-EPA
Licensed) ﬁrms. NSW EPA issues EPLs to proprietors of diﬀerent industrial establishments
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under the 1997 POEA Act. Conditions to obtaining a license include monitoring and pre-
vention of pollution and employing environment-friendly production methods. In addition
to these, license holders have to prepare pollution incident response management plans and
starting from 1st of July, 2012 they have to make monitoring data publicly available. The
requirements for complying with the new strategy have been put down in the Environmental
Guidelines: Requirement for Publishing Pollution Monitoring Data. The main focus of the
policy is to provide data to the general public in a meaningful way, so that it is easy for
them to understand.
NSW's Protection of the Environment Legislation Amendment Act of 2011 made several
changes to the Protection of the Environment Operations Act of 1997 (POEO Act). One of
these changes was that EPLs have to make their emissions data public by either publishing
the monitoring data on the licensee's website, or if the licensee does not have a website, they
have to provide pollution data free of charge to any person requesting it. There are penalties
for not complying with the guidelines or for misreporting.39 The data published must report
the summary of the monitoring data at least on a monthly basis. Moreover, EPLs also have
to inform the public whether the pollutant discharges met or did not meet the standards set
by the NSW EPA.40 Figure 7 shows examples of how NSW EPA expects EPLs to report data
summaries. The POEO Act requires that the monitoring data should be published within
fourteen days of the licensee procuring the data. This gives ﬁrms enough time to create
meaningful summaries for publication on their websites or in print. Currently, there are 4,026
companies in NSW who have an EPL. These establishments include chemical manufacturing,
logging-based companies, metal processing, mining, paper and pulp manufacturing, sewage
39The penalty for reporting bogus or misleading information regarding asbestos waste or hazardous waste
can go up to A$1,500 for an individual and A$5,000 for a corporation. For other types of waste the penalty
is A$750 for individuals and A$1,500 for ﬁrms.
40In addition to these, the EPL number, licensee's name and address also have to be submitted with the
pollution data. A complete list of the additional information that should be provided is given in the EPA
guidelines.
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treatment and transportation companies. Of these EPL holders, 1,183 are located in or near
Sydney and 320 in Newcastle.41
Emissions from the commercial businesses in NSW are meager when compared to the
industrial emissions. EPA-Licensed ﬁrms are one of the major sources of air pollutants in
the Greater Metropolitan Region (GMR) where 75% of the population resides.42 Figure 8
displays charts that detail the contributions to the pollutant levels by diﬀerent sectors in the
GMR. EPA-licensed ﬁrms are the greatest contributor of CO (69%), PM10 (42%) and SO2
(77%), and the second largest contributor of NOx (19%; after road and non-road activities)
and PM2.5 (28%; after household activities) in the region. Figure 9 compares the emissions of
these pollutants from EPA-licensed industries and motor vehicles. Besides NOx, the major
producers of pollutants, relative to automobiles, are EPA-licensed ﬁrms. Hence, the ambient
air pollution is largely determined by the activities of the ﬁrms that are aﬀected by the
policy. According to the EPA Acting Chief Environmental Regulator Mark Giﬀord, the new
policy will make industries more transparent and accountable for the impact they have on
the environment and the community.
III. Econometric framework
Econometric models
This sub-section introduces the empirical approaches employed in the study. First, Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) model is used to estimate the conditional correlation between the
introduction of the new policy and air quality in NSW over time. However, the OLS estimates
have the potential to suﬀer from bias due to the correlation between the unobservables and
the policy over time. The purpose of using the OLS method is to establish a baseline for
41A 25 miles (40 kilometers (km)) radius was drawn around Sydney and a 10 miles (16 km) radius was
drawn around Newcastle to calculate the number of EPL holders near these cities. A larger radius was picked
for Sydney because the data-set contains many suburbs of Sydney (Randwick, Rozelle, Lindﬁeld, Chullora,
Earlwood, Richmond, St. Mary's Vineyard, Prospect, Bargo, Liverpool, Camden and Cambelltown).
42GMR is made up of the three largest cities in NSW: Sydney, Newcastle and Wollongong.
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Figure 7: New South Wales EPA summaries requirements
Courtesy: Environmental Guidelines: Requirement for Publishing Pollution Monitoring Data (2012)
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Figure 8: Emissions by sector in the Greater Metropolitan Region of New South Wales
Courtesy : NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA)
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Figure 9: Emission activities in the Greater Metropolitan Region of New South Wales
NOX CO
PM10 PM2.5
Courtesy : NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA)
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the primary estimation strategy. The second approach employed is a Discontinuity Based
Ordinary Least Squares (DB-OLS) model. If the unobservables evolve continuously and
smoothly around the cutoﬀ on either side of the discontinuity, this approach will solve the
issues most likely present in the simple OLS model.
Ordinary Least Squares - The basic OLS model is given below by equation (17). It simply
estimates the time series model using OLS.
log(Pollutantt) = δ0 + δ1 [1(τ ≥ Policy)] + Xtδ2 + εt (17)
where [1(τ ≥ Policy)] is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 when the policy went
into eﬀect (July 1st, 2012) and 0 otherwise.43 Xt includes quartics in average daily measures
of weather variables (temperature, humidity and wind speed), day of the week and month
dummy variables; εt is the error term. The coeﬃcient of interest in (17) is δ1, which rep-
resents the eﬀect of the policy on air quality. δ1 is expected to be negative: after the new
policy was put in place, air quality is expected to improve (pollutant concentration levels
decrease). The new policy might put pressure on ﬁrms to reduce emissions and this would
aﬀect the environmental quality positively. However, this simple approach has the potential
to produce biased estimates of δ1. A time series regression for NSW that attempts to develop
a relationship between air quality and the new information strategy is unlikely to provide an
estimate of δ1 that can be interpreted causally because any other time-varying factors that
aﬀect pollution might well be correlated with the policy indicator. This is particularly true
for NSW where besides the new strategy, several other environmental instruments (Green-
house Gas Reduction Scheme (GGAS) (enforced in 2003), Clean Cars Action Plan (enforced
in 2010), vapor recovery reporting at petrol station (enforced in 2010)) have been recently
43Log-linear models were preferred over linear models as these are relatively more robust.
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adopted to improve the environmental quality.44 These other measures are also likely to
decrease pollutant concentration levels indicating an improvement in air quality. Assigning
all the credit of these improvements to δ1 would be inaccurate. Similarly, during the post-
(pre-) intervention period, pollutant levels could also increase (decrease) due to a variety
of other reasons (changes in economic activity, changes in government policy), which would
under- (over-) state the eﬀect of the disclosure policy.45 Therefore, the coeﬃcient of interest
is likely to be biased in this model.
Discontinuity-Based Ordinary Least Squares - To overcome the problem of correlation be-
tween the policy indicator and the unobservable determinants of air quality, Discontinuity
Based Ordinary Least Squares (DB-OLS) model is estimated. This empirical strategy will
exploit the sharp discontinuity presented by the introduction of the new information dis-
closure policy. The advantage of this approach is the identiﬁcation of exogenous sources of
variation in expected air quality.46 The DB-OLS model is given below:
log(Pollutantt) = δ0 + δ1 [1(τ ≥ Policy)] + Xtδ2 + δ3ψ(t) + µt (18)
In the model above the coeﬃcient of interest is δ1, which exhibits the eﬀect of the policy
on air pollution. [1(τ ≥ Policy)] is, as before, equal to 1 starting from July 1st, 2012 and
equal to 0 before the implementation of the policy. Xt includes quartics in average weather
44The NSW Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme (GGAS) was incorporated on 1st January 2003. It
is a mandatory greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme. Clean Cars Action Plan came into place
after the implementation of Protection of the Environment Operations (Clear Air) Regulation 2010.
Vapor recovery reporting at petrol station is also part of this regulation. For more on these see
http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/air. Additionally in 2012, electricity prices in NSW were increased
by 16%. An increase in electricity prices would decrease its demand. This would reduce mining and com-
bustion of coal used in electricity production, and hence decrease pollutants such as PM10, PM2.5, and
NO2.
45In 2013 alone, there was at least a 50% increase in air pollution breaches in Newcastle relative to
previous years. This was mostly due to increase in mining for coal for electricity production.
46Alternatively, one could also employ a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DID) strategy to analyze the eﬀect of
the policy. For DID in addition to NSW pollution data, the researcher would also need pollution data for
cities outside the province to form counterfactuals. DID analysis are presented as a robustness check and
DB-OLS method is used as the main empirical strategy. The results of both approaches are similar.
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covariates (temperature, wind speed and humidity) and day of the week and month dummies
to control for seasonality. The vector ψ(t) is a polynomial time-trend that will control for
time series variation in pollution that would have occurred in the absence of the new policy
in NSW. It is these controls that take account of the changes in economic activity for the
time frame being studied. They also account for the changes in air pollution as a result of
other polices adopted by NSW that could aﬀect air pollution over time. µt is the noise term
and it is assumed that E(µt | 1(τ ≥ Policy), Xt, ψ(t)) = 0.
The empirical strategy rests upon the assumption that the only factor that aﬀects air
pollution discontinuously on 1st July, 2012 is the implementation of the new information
disclosure strategy. By controlling for the non-linear variation in air pollution from other
determinants using a polynomial time-trend, the coeﬃcient of interest can be interpreted
causally as changes in air quality are attributed solely to the new policy. Any diﬀerences
in other factors that change continuously around the date the policy was enforced will be
captured by the polynomial. Porter (2003) suggests that odd order polynomials should
be preferred as they have better econometric properties. Accordingly, I use a third-order
polynomial in my base model. However, validity and robustness of these estimates will be
tested by considering diﬀerent speciﬁcations. In particular, diﬀerent polynomial orders will
be considered to examine the robustness of the estimates. The DB-OLS approach overcomes
the bias associated with the simple OLS time series method as it is not endangered by the
other unobservable factors that could aﬀect air quality in the time frame of interest. This
approach is similar to the one employed by Davis (2008) and Chen and Whalley (2011).
The coeﬃcient of interest, δ1, could be negative: the implementation of the new policy
improves air quality. However, this eﬀect depends on the behavior of ﬁrms in response to
the new strategy and how citizens and other third parties react to the new information that
becomes available to them. If the combination of pressures of the policy and those concerned
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about the pollution levels is eﬀective and ﬁrms do reduce emissions, δ1 < 0.
47 On the other
hand δ1 ≈ 0, if these pressures are not signiﬁcant or instrumental in aﬀecting ﬁrm behavior.
As the precise magnitude of the eﬀect of the new instrument is not clear, estimating the
magnitude of δ1 is considered to be an empirical question. Finally as mentioned above, δ1
can be given a causal interpretation in model (18) as many sources of spurious correlations
are taken care of by the DB-OLS approach.48
Data
The empirical analysis requires high-frequency data for air pollution. Fortunately, high qual-
ity data for pollutants is available for New South Wales. The data source used for the study
is the NSW EPA air quality monitoring network. Currently, NSW EPA monitors air quality
at twenty-four diﬀerent stations. Sydney's air has been monitored since the 1960s, but grad-
ually other cities and towns were included in the network. In June 1998, two major changes
were implemented in relation to how air quality was reported in Australia: (i) national
standards for measuring air quality were placed and (ii) national reporting was introduced.
The ﬁve pollutants measured under the 1998 standards are carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen
dioxide (NO2), ozone (O3), particulate matter (PM10 and PM2.5) and sulfur dioxide (SO2).
Due to limited data for SO2, these readings were not collected. The level of CO, NO2, PM10
and PM2.5 emissions are reported in the EPA-Licensed ﬁrms reports. O3 is produced when
NOx, CO and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) react in the presence of sunlight and heat
and hence is correlated with the reported pollutants. NO2, CO, PM10, PM2.5 and O3 levels
47If δ1 < 0, there could be signiﬁcant savings in health costs. For example, a publication by the De-
partment of Environment and Conservation, NSW in 2005 titled Air Pollution Economics reported that a
contraction of PM10 by 10 µg/m
3 on average has a long-term exposure-response of reducing mortality by
2.6% - 6.1%, respiratory hospital admissions by 0.5% - 1.1% and cardiovascular hospital admissions by 0.6%
- 1.3%.
48Since this is time-series data, successive observations are likely to be correlated. Both models are
estimated using multiple lags and model choice was based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) statistic.
5-weeks lagged values serve as an upper bound under the above criterion for all pollutants. The magnitude
and signiﬁcance of the auto-correlation coeﬃcients decrease after lags of 5-weeks. Hence to account for auto-
correlation, variance-covariance matrices are constructed such that they allow for correlation within 5-weeks
clusters. Chen and Whalley (2001) and Davis (2008) also cluster the standard errors at the 5-weeks level.
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Figure 10: Monitoring Sites in New South Wales
Courtesy : NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA)
for the two largest cities in NSW, Sydney and Newcastle were compiled and are treated
as measures of air quality.49 Figure 10 shows the the locations of the monitoring sites for
each city. Daily weather variables (temperature, wind speed and humidity) were collected
from Australian Bureau of Meteorology. For the main analysis, averages across monitoring
stations in a city were taken to analyze daily time-series of air quality.
The sample period chosen for the empirical analysis includes all observations within a
two-year period (2011-2013): twelve months before and twelve months after the introduction
49Sydney is the largest city in Australia with a population of 4.75 million and population density equal
to 380/km2 (980/sq. mi). Newcastle is the second largest city in NSW with a population of 308,000 and
population density of 1,103 /km2 (2,860/sq. mi). Geographically, Newcastle is 162 km (101 mi) from Sydney.
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of the policy. Since, the main empirical strategy involves usage of a discontinuity based
ordinary least squares, expanding the data set beyond June 2013 will not add precision
to our estimates. As a matter of fact, conceptually discontinuity based estimates produce
local average treatment eﬀects and using data points close to the discontinuity are preferred.
On the other hand, precision of the estimates is aﬀected as the sample size decreases. Air
quality data is continuous and using observations further from the window would improve
the precision of the parameters. Moreover as pointed out by Davis (2008), to control for
seasonal variation in air pollution one should at least use data that spans over two-years.
Following Davis (2008) and Chen and Whalley (2012) atmospheric conditions are controlled
for in the econometric models as they can signiﬁcantly aﬀect pollution levels.
Table 13 provides the summary statistics for air quality measures and weather variables
for both cities. The ﬁrst column reports the descriptive statistics for the entire sample.
This is broken down into pre- and post- policy periods in columns 2 and 3, respectively.
Column 4 compares these two columns and reports the diﬀerences and standard errors in
parentheses. The null hypothesis that is being tested in column 4 is that the variables do
not diﬀer between the pre- and the post-policy periods.
Columns 1-3 of Table 13 show the means and variations in the variables across both
cities. Glancing across Table 13, one could observe that on average Newcastle had higher
levels of NO2, PM10 and O3.
50 Comparing pollutant concentrations in Sydney and Newcastle
to other developed cities of similar sizes lends support to the fact that Australia has some
of the best air quality in the world. Average changes in pollutant concentration are mixed
in pre- and post-policy scenarios. For instance, on average NO2 and CO levels declined in
Sydney in the post-intervention period. However, PM10 , PM2.5 and O3 levels increased. In
Newcastle, PM10 levels intensiﬁed whereas changes to NO2 and O3 were not statistically
signiﬁcant. These diﬀerences in pre- and post- policy pollutant levels might not only be
because of the new information disclosure strategy. There could be other factors, such as
50PM2.5 is not reported by the monitoring stations in Newcastle. CO readings for Newcastle were dropped
due to a large number of missing values.
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variations in weather patterns that could explain these changes. Descriptive statistics for
the variables associated with weather are also shown in Table 13.
An issue of concern from Table 13 is that there are signiﬁcant pre- and post- diﬀerences
in certain weather variables: wind speed for Sydney and humidity for both cities. This could
violate the assumption that in the absence of the policy, pollutant concentration level would
have changed continuously on the policy implementation date. However, note that these
diﬀerences are very small. Hence following Davis (2008), a model with a two-year window
that controls for these weather measures is estimated. Controlling for atmospheric conditions
will only increase the precision of the estimates. Another concern could be that the main
results might be driven by these unconventional changes in weather conditions. However
to ensure the validity of the estimation method, a model without weather covariates is also
estimated.
IV. Results
OLS results
Table 14 reports the coeﬃcient estimates from the simple OLS model (equation (17)). In
all the regressions reported, quartics in weather covariates and day of the week and month
dummies are included in Xt. Due to auto-correlation, standard errors are clustered at the
5-weeks level. Table 14 produces mixed and at times counter-intuitive results. According
to Sydney's OLS results, NO2 and CO concentration levels declined by 5 percent and 24
percent, respectively. On the other hand, PM10, PM2.5 and O3 levels increased by 10 percent,
34 percent and 5 percent, respectively. The results for Newcastle indicate that NO2 levels
declined by 14 percent and PM10 levels increased by 13 percent.
However, as mentioned before these estimates have the potential to suﬀer from bias asso-
ciated with unobservables. Other economic behavior or activity not controlled for in equation
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Table 14: The eﬀect of the policy on air quality in New South Wales: basic OLS results
Dependent
variable:
Log(NO2) Log(CO) Log(PM10) Log(PM2.5) Log(O3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A:
Sydney
Post-
intervention
-0.047* -0.237*** 0.096*** 0.341*** 0.052**
(0.024) (0.038) (0.024) (0.033) (0.023)
# of obs. 9,462 3,196 9,645 2,775 9,634
Panel B:
Newcastle
Post-
intervention
-0.143*** 0.143*** 0.018
(0.033) (0.041) (0.038)
# of obs. 699 723 716
Notes: The estimates reported in columns 1-5 are associated with coeﬃcients estimates from basic
the OLS model represented by equation (17). In all these regression, quartics in average weather
covariates (temperature, wind and humidity), day of the week ﬁxed eﬀects and month ﬁxed eﬀects
were included. The unit of observation is day. Standard errors, which were clustered at 5-week
level, are reported in parentheses.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. * Signiﬁcant at the 10
percent level.
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(17) might be driving these results. Discontinuity based OLS results, which overcome these
biases are discussed below.
DB-OLS results
The main ﬁndings of the study are reported in Table 15, which shows the results for the
model represented by equation (18). For each regression, in addition to quartics in weather
covariates and day of the week and month ﬁxed eﬀects, a 3rd order polynomial time-trend
is included in Xt. The purpose of including these covariates is to control for observed
time series variation in factors aﬀecting pollution that would have occurred in the absence
of the treatment. The reason for including the polynomial time-trend is to control for time
varying unobservables that could potentially inﬂuence the coeﬃcient estimates and engender
incorrect inference.
According to the results produced in Table 15, the implementation of the disclosure
policy had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on pollutant concentration levels.51 The results are also quite
distinct from Table 14, as the coeﬃcients are larger in magnitude and at times have the
opposite sign. These results further increase skepticism of the basic OLS results.52 These
eﬀects are also demonstrated graphically by Figures 11 and 12. In these ﬁgures, pollutant
time-trends before and after the policy are plotted. A third-order polynomial trend line and
the date when the policy was introduced (shown by the broken line) are also incorporated.
Breaks in pollutant levels can be observed at the point of discontinuity but these breaks are
51If the reason for the null eﬀect is the noise in the data, then one has to be careful with the interpretation.
However, I also make use of a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences (DID) method, which has a diﬀerent data generating
process. The DID strategy produces results that are similar to the DB-OLS strategy. Furthermore, I also
re-run the DB-OLS with smaller windows (3 months, 6 months, etc.) and the results do not change. Given
the DID results and variations of the actual model, it could be ascertained that δ1 is most likely capturing
the true eﬀect of the disclosure policy.
52Estimates of DB-OLS and OLS are not directly comparable. Generally, the average treatment eﬀects
with DB-OLS model are estimated at the margin of receiving the treatment. An additional implicit assump-
tion that is being made is that there were no other treatments at the cut-oﬀ data (July 1, 2012) that would
aﬀect air quality. If this assumption is violated, then these estimates are not totally attributable to the new
policy. Moreover, the estimates will be biased if the functional form between the treatment and the outcome
is not correctly speciﬁed.
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Table 15: The eﬀect of the policy on air quality in New South Wales: DB-OLS results
Dependent
variable:
Log(NO2) Log(CO) Log(PM10) Log(PM2.5) Log(O3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A:
Sydney
Post-
intervention
0.540 0.293 -0.395 -0.446 0.449
(0.814) (0.956) (0.462) (0.804) (0.613)
# of obs. 9,462 3,196 9,645 2,775 9,634
Panel B:
Newcastle
Post-
intervention
0.751 -0.361 -0.126
(1.238) (0.726) (1.021)
# of obs. 699 723 716
Notes: The estimates reported in columns 1-5 are associated with coeﬃcients estimates from the
discontinuity-based OLS model represented by equation (18). In all these regression, quartics in
average weather covariates (temperature, wind and humidity), day of the week and month ﬁxed
eﬀects were included. The unit of observation is day. Standard errors, which were clustered at
5-week level, are reported in parentheses.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. * Signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level.
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not prominent. The pollutants are approximately moving continuously around the policy
date. These graphs provide further support to the identiﬁcation assumptions. The purpose
of showing these graphs is to demonstrate the inconsequential discontinuity that emerges
because of the implementation of the policy that is not apparent in the raw data. As
demonstrated earlier in Figure 6, detection of a discontinuity without the time-trend could
be challenging because of the variations in air pollution.
There could be numerous factors that could explain these insigniﬁcant responses of pol-
lutant concentration levels. Information disclosure is expected to inﬂuence household behav-
ior, particularly if actual emissions are above household's prior beliefs about these emissions.
Governments, instead of regulating emissions, make it possible for residents to be made
aware of the level of emissions. There are two central players in this game: the polluters
and the citizens aﬀected by the pollution. The aﬀected parties can use tools developed by
the government (lawsuits or public policy), interest groups (media exposure) or the market
(consumer boycotts) to negotiate change. Hence, the government acts as a facilitator rather
than a forcing body in the society. If the new information does not conﬂict with the house-
hold's prior beliefs then the behavior of the citizens is unaﬀected and they do not put any
pressure on ﬁrms to reduce emissions. In other words, environmental information between
the households and the ﬁrms in NSW might not be asymmetrical and hence, households
did not consider any further action. It could also be that the ﬁrms might have predicted
that the households are not concerned with the current pollution levels and did not take any
necessary avoidance measures. Another potential reason for small eﬀects of the policy could
be that the performance of Australian cities is quite superior to that of other developed cities
when it comes to air pollution. Industrial emissions were controlled extensively even before
the policy went into eﬀect which might have not necessitated any action from the public.
Since, continuous management of environmental resources in NSW is surpassing other re-
gions, households do not want to reduce the level of emissions any further by substituting
other goods. Lastly, it is also possible that households were unaware of the new policy or
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are unconcerned about the environmental issues. However, the media attention that was
given to the policy and the environmental performance in NSW historically, this last point
probably does not hold.
One criticism that could be raised against the results is that they emerge this way because
of the time-trend speciﬁcation that is used rather than because of the information disclosure
strategy. To test for this, polynomials of diﬀerent orders are tested. Secondly, some of
the weather covariates do not move continuously around the implementation date. This
could violate the assumption that in the absence of the policy, pollutant concentration level
would have changed continuously when the treatment went into eﬀect. Smoothness of these
weather covariates is also scrutinized. Finally, if the policy implementation is truly random,
it should have no eﬀect on air quality in some other city outside the province of NSW. The
next section deals with these and other robustness checks.
Robustness checks
In this sub-section (i) the validity of the identiﬁcation assumption and (ii) the robustness
of the main results are examined. A major criticism regarding the empirical strategy that
could be raised is that the ﬁrms could have anticipated the policy and acted prior to the
policy. Conversely, it could also be true that the ﬁrms acted on the policy not on the
implementation date but perhaps at a later date. To overcome this, I also evaluate the
policy using a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences (DID) strategy. DID is less sensitive to the exact
timing of the eﬀect relative to the DB-OLS method. The DID is identifying oﬀ the averages
across all the post-treatment months, not just at the discontinuity. This model compares
the changes in pollution levels before and after the policy date between Sydney (where the
policy was introduced) and Perth (the counter-factual city). Perth, the provincial capital of
Western Australia (WA), is the fourth largest city in Australia (after Sydney, Brisbane and
Melbourne) and the largest city on the western front. Geographically it is 4,000 km (2,486
mi) from Sydney and due to substantial distance it is highly improbable that air quality in
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NSW could aﬀect air quality in WA, or vice versa.53 The DID model estimated is given by
equation (3).
log(Pollutantt) = β0+β1 [1(τ ≥ Policy)]+β2Sydney+β3 [1(τ ≥ Policy) × Sydney]+Xtβ4+ξt
(19)
In the above model the coeﬃcient of interest is β3, which captures these diﬀerences.
Again, [1(τ ≥ Policy)] is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 when the policy went
into eﬀect (July 1st, 2012) and a value of 0 otherwise. Sydney is a dummy variable that
takes a value of 1 for all monitoring stations in Sydney and a value of 0 for all stations in
Perth. Xt includes quartics in average weather covariates (temperature, wind speed and
humidity), a 3rd- order time-trend, and day of the week and month dummies. Table 16
shows the results of the DID model with and without the covariates. The results are similar
to the results reported in Table 15. DID results show that the policy mainly had no eﬀect
on pollutant concentration levels. The only pollutant that has a negative coeﬃcient is CO
indicating that CO levels in Sydney declined in the post-treatment period relative to Perth.
On the other hand, PM2.5 levels increased in the post-treatment period in Sydney relative
to Perth. Secondly, I also do some variants of the DID model, where I drop the ﬁrst three,
six and nine months of the post-treatment period. The results of these speciﬁcations, also
shown in Table 16, are similar to the general DID results. Given that the trimming of the
earliest post-treatment months until the data is only comprised of the last three months of
the post-treatment period, does not change the results, one could be conﬁdent that the null
eﬀects of the policy produced by the DB-OLS results are not due to the timing problem.54
53Perth has a population of around 2 million and a population density of 310/km2(800/sq. mi), slightly
lower than Sydney's density (compare to footnote 21). Main industries in the city are mining, manufacturing
and construction. Perth pollutant data for the time time period 2011-2013 was provided by the Department
of Environmental Regulation, WA.
54Alternatively, I break the data into one month, two months and three months periods and run a dummy
regression model to check for discontinuous jumps in the 24-month period. There are signiﬁcant jumps or
underlying time trends in the concentration levels in various months leading up to the policy. These ﬁndings
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Table 16: The eﬀect of the policy on air quality in New South Wales: DID results
Dependent variable: Log(NO2) Log(CO) Log(PM10) Log(PM2.5) Log(O3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: No
covariates
Post-intervention ×
Sydney
-0.070 -0.261** 0.100 0.391*** 0.162**
(0.085) (0.098) (0.071) (0.098) (0.060)
# of obs. 11,592 4,677 11,096 4,212 11,631
Panel B:
Including
covariates
Post-intervention ×
Sydney
-0.027 -0.204*** 0.053 0.382*** 0.079
(0.045) (0.070) (0.045) (0.088) (0.050)
# of obs. 11,592 4,677 11,096 4,212 11,631
Panel C:
Trimming
post-intervention
Post-intervention ×
Sydney (3 months
trimmed)
-0.011 -0.219** 0.078 0.424*** 0.095
(0.044) (0.081) (0.047) (0.092) (0.058)
Post-intervention ×
Sydney (6 months
trimmed)
-0.047 -0.293*** 0.057 0.487*** 0.051
(0.039) (0.084) (0.052) (0.108) (0.068)
Post-intervention ×
Sydney (9 months
trimmed)
-0.032 -0.243** 0.080 0.674*** -0.032
(0.052) (0.093) (0.074) (0.126) (0.063)
Notes: The estimates reported in columns 1-5 are associated with coeﬃcients estimates from the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model represented by equation (4). In all these regressions quartics in
average weather covariates (temperature, wind and humidity), day of the week and month ﬁxed
eﬀects were included unless otherwise stated.. The unit of observation is day. Standard errors,
which were clustered at 5-week level, are reported in parentheses.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. * Signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level.
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Table 17: The eﬀect of the policy on air quality in Perth, Western Australia
Dependent
variable:
Log(NO2) Log(CO) Log(PM10) Log(PM2.5) Log(O3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fake post-
intervention
-1.010 -0.480 0.040 0.112 0.785*
(0.644) (0.704) (0.059) (0.122) (0.419)
# of obs. 2,283 1,522 1,522 1,522 1,522
Notes: The estimates reported in columns 1-5 are associated with coeﬃcients estimates from the
discontinuity-based OLS model represented by equation (18). In all these regression, quartics in
average weather covariates (temperature, wind and humidity), day of the week and month ﬁxed
eﬀects were included. The unit of observation is day. Standard errors, which were clustered at
5-week level, are reported in parentheses.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. * Signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level.
To analyze the randomness of the policy implementation date, one could check for dis-
continuities where they should not be present. If the authorities could predict industrial
emissions on a given date and chose the implementation date based on these predictions
then the identiﬁcation assumption will not hold. If the treatment is truly random then it
should not aﬀect the distribution of air pollution in another region of Australia, since it was
peculiar to NSW. To examine this, the DB-OLS model is executed for Perth. The results for
Perth are shown in Table 17. As expected, the policy had no signiﬁcant impact on any of the
pollutants (besides O
3
, coeﬃcient of which is positive) in the counterfactual city. Results of
Table 17 are demonstrated graphically in Figure 13. A third-order polynomial time-trend is
inserted into this ﬁgure. A discontinuity in the distributions of these pollutants in Perth is
not apparent on the implementation date.
Another inquiry regarding the randomness of the policy could be observing the eﬀect of
a counter-factual policy on the distribution of air pollution. For this, the date of the policy
is changed from 1st July, 2012 to 3/6 months prior and 3/6 months post to the actual policy
date. These placebo tests are conducted to examine whether a break is observed at the fake-
policy dates. Results of the fake-policies are given in Table 18 and Table 19. As shown by
support the assertion made with regards to the OLS methodology: there are presumably some sort of
underlying time trends even prior to the policy, and hence the OLS results will be biased.
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Table 18: The eﬀect of the fake-prior policy on air quality in New South Wales: DB-OLS
results
Dependent variable: Log(NO2) Log(CO) Log(PM10) Log(PM2.5) Log(O3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Sydney
Intervention 3 months
prior to actual date
0.640 0.474 -0.243 -0.332 0.474
(0.832) (0.817) (0.483) (0.844) (0.594)
# of obs. 9,551 3,327 9,668 2,805 10,108
Intervention 6 months
prior to actual date
0.229 -0.175 -0.261 -0.420 0.117
(0.864) (0.583) (0.435) (0.767) (0.854)
# of obs. 9,638 3,411 9,759 2,809 10,032
Panel B: Newcastle
Intervention 3 months
prior to actual date
1.315 0.321 0.184
(1.268) (0.777) (0.964)
# of obs. 715 723 715
Intervention 6 months
prior to actual date
1.277 0.073 0.249
(1.266) (0.729) (0.903)
# of obs. 716 725 719
Notes: The estimates reported in columns 1-5 are associated with coeﬃcients estimates from the
discontinuity-based OLS model represented by equation (18). In all these regression, quartics in
average weather covariates (temperature, wind and humidity), day of the week and month ﬁxed
eﬀects were included. The unit of observation is day. Standard errors, which were clustered at
5-week level, are reported in parentheses.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. * Signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level.
the results, the distribution of the pollutants are unaﬀected in response to the fake-policies.
Therefore, it can be stated that a few months prior/post to the the actual-policy, pollutants
followed a continuous trend and ﬁrms did not act early or late on the policy. These ﬁndings
further increase the conﬁdence in the main results.
Model (18) assumes that the time-trend before and after the policy implementation is
the same. The following model relaxes this assumption by adding interactions between
[1(τ ≥ Policy)] and the polynomial time-trend. Adding the interaction term enhances the
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Table 19: The eﬀect of the fake-post policy on air quality in New South Wales: DB-OLS
results
Dependent variable: Log(NO2) Log(CO) Log(PM10) Log(PM2.5) Log(O3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Sydney
Intervention 3 months
post to actual date
0.475 0.481 -0.037 0.080 0.476
(0.817) (0.967) (0.493) (0.805) (0.553)
# of obs. 9,572 3,327 9,768 2,856 10,295
Intervention 6 months
post to actual date
0.500 0.747 -0.346 -0.467 0.274
(0.800) (0.937) (0.541) (0.734) (0.525)
# of obs. 9,618 3,412 9,878 2,941 10,368
Panel B: Newcastle
Intervention 3 months
post to actual date
0.509 -0.063 0.113
(1.145) (0.706) (0.989)
# of obs. 715 722 717
Intervention 6 months
post to actual date
0.155 -0.240 0.102
(0.942) (0.695) (0.985)
# of obs. 714 722 716
Notes: The estimates reported in columns 1-5 are associated with coeﬃcients estimates from the
discontinuity-based OLS model represented by equation (18). In all these regression, quartics in
average weather covariates (temperature, wind and humidity), day of the week and month ﬁxed
eﬀects were included. The unit of observation is day. Standard errors, which were clustered at
5-week level, are reported in parentheses.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. * Signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level.
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ﬂexibility of the model as it allows the time-trend to diﬀer after the implementation of the
policy.
log(Pollutantt) = δ0+δ1 [1(τ ≥ Policy)]+Xtδ2+δ3ψ(t)+δ5 [ψ (t)× 1(τ ≥ Policy)]+λt (20)
In the model above the coeﬃcient of interest is δ1, which represents the eﬀect of the
policy on air pollution. [1(τ ≥ Policy)] is as before equal to 1 after the policy and 0 before
its implementation. Xt includes quartics in average weather variables , day of the week
and month dummies. The vector ψ(t) is a polynomial time-trend that controls for time
series variation in the pollution levels. In addition to the model given by (18), interactions
between [1(τ ≥ Policy)] and the polynomial time-trend are added to the DB-OLS regression
to diﬀerentiate the time-trend in pollution before and after the policy. λt is the error term.
Table 20 shows the results of the speciﬁcation shown above. Again the results are consistent
with the main results. Even after allowing for diﬀerences in time-trend before and after
the policy implementation date the eﬀects of the policy were negligible. Furthermore, the
coeﬃcient estimates of Table 15 and Table 20 are quite similar. These ﬁndings lend support
to the claim that for each city, before and after the policy, the time-trend was approximately
the same.
One concern from Table 13 were diﬀerences in humidity and wind speed in pre- and
post- policy periods. This has the potential to violate a crucial assumption of the DB-
OLS estimation method. Table 21 examines the smoothness of the weather covariates.
Again equation (18) is employed but atmospheric conditions replace the pollutants as the
dependent variables and all weather covariates are excluded from Xt. According to Table 21,
all weather covariates move smoothly around the policy implementation date for both cities.
Furthermore, diﬀerences in these variables between the pre- and post- policy periods are not
a major concern as the coeﬃcient estimates without the weather covariates (see Table 22,
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Table 20: The eﬀect of the policy on air quality in New South Wales: DB-OLS results with
the interaction between the treatment and the polynomial time-trend
Dependent
variable:
Log(NO2) Log(CO) Log(PM10) Log(PM2.5) Log(O3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A:
Sydney
Post-
intervention
0.566 0.316 -0.395 -0.415 0.503
(0.634) (0.884) (0.462) (0.696) (0.557)
# of obs. 9,462 3,196 9,645 2,775 9,634
Panel B:
Newcastle
Post-
intervention
0.686 -0.360 -0.069
(1.038) (0.651) (0.875)
# of obs. 699 723 716
Notes: The estimates reported in columns 1-5 are associated with coeﬃcients estimates from the
discontinuity-based OLS model represented by equation (20). In all these regression, quartics in
average weather covariates (temperature, wind and humidity), day of the week and month ﬁxed
eﬀects were included. The unit of observation is day. Standard errors, which were clustered at
5-week level, are reported in parentheses.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. * Signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level.
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Table 21: Smoothness of the weather covariates
Dependent
variable:
Temperature Wind speed Humidity
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A:
Sydney
Post-
intervention
-10.479 1.173 -0.397
(7.063) (0.915) (0.318)
# of obs. 731 731 731
Panel B:
Newcastle
Post-
intervention
-9.408 1.197 -0.222
(6.531) (1.428) (0.291)
# of obs. 731 731 731
Notes: The estimates reported in columns 1-3 are associated with coeﬃcients estimates from
discontinuity-based OLS model represented by equation (18). Instead of pollutant levels, weather
covariates are used as dependent variables. In all these regressions day of the week and month ﬁxed
eﬀects were included. The unit of observation is day. Standard errors, which were clustered at
5-week level, are reported in parentheses.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. * Signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level.
row 1 for each Panel) are similar to the main results. Even though without the weather
controls one observes small diﬀerences in magnitudes of the estimates, conclusions drawn
from the main results remain intact and it does not appear to be atmospheric conditions
that are driving the results.
In Table 22, alternative polynomial orders are also tested. Equation (18) is executed with
5th- and 7th- order polynomials (rows 3 and 4 for each Panel in Table 22). Porter (2003)
recommended that odd-order polynomials have better econometric properties. Higher order
polynomials were chosen based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) statistics. Again
signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient estimates are unaﬀected under higher polynomial orders. Lastly,
Table 22 also reports the estimation results with Newey-West standard errors (row 2 for each
Panel, Table 22). These standard errors allow for correlation between the observations within
a ﬁve-weeks lag. The results remain insigniﬁcant with Newey-West standard errors. These
78
analyses were also replicated for Wollongong, the third largest city in NSW. The results for
Wollongong are similar to the results for Sydney and Newcastle.
Another criticism that could be raised is with regards to the time period used in the
main empirical method. In the main results a one-year window before and after the policy is
used. Since the main estimation strategy is discontinuity-based, there should be no harm in
using a smaller window. I re-run the DB-OLS model shown by equation (18) for a 3-months
window without the weather covariates and the time-trend. These results are shown in Table
23. The signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient estimates is mainly unaﬀected. The only coeﬃcient
estimates that are signiﬁcant are those associated with CO and O3. When a smaller time-
frame is considered, CO levels declined and O3 levels increased after the introduction of the
policy.55 The corresponding graphs of Table 23 are presented in Figures 14 and 15.
V. Conclusion
Information disclosure policies attempt to reduce information asymmetries between ﬁrms,
citizens and third parties (governments, NGOs, journalists). It is anticipated that such
policies should produce reactions from the citizens and other third parties, particularly,
when emissions are beyond what was initially expected. These pressures should coerce ﬁrms
to modify their behavior so that the emissions produced by them are in align with what
people believe to be acceptable. If the ﬁrms do alter their behavior due to the introduction
of the disclosure policy, air quality should improve. This paper studies the impact of such a
disclosure policy in NSW, Australia. A regression discontinuity design was employed and the
results show that the concentration levels of pollutants were mainly unaﬀected in NSW. The
discontinuity based OLS results are quite robust to diﬀerent model speciﬁcations. Hence,
55Even though a positive relationship between O3 and the policy is counter-intuitive, it is not surprising.
O3 is produced when NOx, CO and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) react in the presence of sunlight
and heat. Its is produced through a non-linear process, which depends on local atmospheric conditions and
ﬂuctuates with space and time. This was also noted by Chen and Whalley (2012). Also see Seinfeld and
Pandis (1998).
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Table 22: The eﬀect of the policy on air quality in New South Wales: alternative speciﬁca-
tions
Dependent
variable:
Log(NO2) Log(CO) Log(PM10) Log(PM2.5) Log(O3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A:
Sydney
No weather
controls
-0.060 -0.330 -0.625 -1.228 0.344
(0.772) (0.777) (0.577) (0.759) (0.621)
Newey-West
std. errors
0.540 0.293 -0.395 -0.446 0.449
(0.791) (0.924) (0.572) (0.908) (0.585)
5th order
polynomial
0.670 0.381 -0.293 -0.263 0.569
(0.776) (0.942) (0.426) (0.728) (0.587)
7th order
polynomial
0.584 0.304 -0.341 -0.337 0.494
(0.515) (0.816) (0.404) (0.574) (0.490)
Panel B:
Newcastle
No weather
controls
0.231 -0.777 0.074
(1.441) (0.692) (0.885)
Newey-West
std. errors
0.751 -0.361 -0.126
(1.223) (0.779) (0.957)
5th order
polynomial
0.634 -0.231 0.064
(1.222) (0.681) (0.875)
7th order
polynomial
0.540 -0.353 -0.017
(0.870) (0.611) (0.781)
Notes: The estimates reported in columns 1-5 are associated with coeﬃcients estimates from the
discontinuity-based OLS model represented by equation (18). In all these regression, quartics in
average weather covariates (temperature, wind and humidity), day of the week and month ﬁxed
eﬀects were included unless otherwise stated. In the ﬁrst regression, equation (18) is estimated
without weather covariates. In the second regression, equation (2) is estimated with Newey-West
standard errors. In the third and fourth regressions, a 5th order and a 7th order polynomial replaces
the 3rd order polynomial in equation (18), respectively. The unit of observation is day. Standard
errors, which were clustered at 5-week level, are reported in parentheses.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. * Signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level.
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Table 23: The eﬀect of the policy on air quality in New South Wales: DB-OLS results  3
months window
Dependent
variable:
Log(NO2) Log(CO) Log(PM10) Log(PM2.5) Log(O3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A:
Sydney
Post-
intervention
-0.091 -0.168* 0.086 0.191 0.358**
(0.083) (0.082) (0.087) (0.199) (0.117)
# of obs. 2,402 835 2,466 690 2,432
Panel B:
Newcastle
Post-
intervention
0.064 0.083 0.300*
(0.063) (0.108) (0.128)
# of obs. 171 177 177
Notes: The estimates reported in columns 1-5 are associated with coeﬃcients estimates from the
discontinuity-based OLS model represented by equation (18). In all these regression, quartics in
average weather covariates (temperature, wind and humidity), day of the week and month ﬁxed
eﬀects were included unless otherwise stated. The unit of observation is day. Standard errors,
which were clustered at 5-week level, are reported in parentheses.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. * Signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level.
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the policy was not instrumental in reducing the concentration levels of the contaminants in
the air. One potential reason for the negligible eﬀects of the policy could be that pollutant
concentration levels in NSW are already too low and an additional instrument will have little
or no impact on reducing pollutant intensity. Another reason for the null eﬀects could be that
information with regards to emissions between the public and the ﬁrms is not asymmetrical
and hence did not necessitate any action from the households.
This study focused only on the short-term impacts of the policy; long-term eﬀects are
not analyzed. It is probable that the level of current consumption that individuals are
willing to give up for an improvement in the environment, might fade oﬀ with time. This
will decrease pressure exerted on ﬁrms and air quality might worsen even in the presence
of environmental policies. Furthermore, the eﬀects are expected to vary from region to
region and should also depend on socio-economic characteristics. Therefore, it is not clear
what would be the relative eﬀectiveness of such a policy in diﬀerent demographics. Before
implementing information-based regulations policy-makers should evaluate the mechanisms
and the regions where they are most likely to be eﬀective.
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Chapter 3: What determines citizen trust: evaluating the impact of
campaigns highlighting government reforms in Pakistan
I. Introduction
Higher levels of trust within a society promote economic activity as trust reduces transaction
costs by eliminating the need to undertake costly eﬀorts to learn about the trustworthiness
of others. The inﬂuence of trust on economic development and societal well-being has been
well documented in the previous literature. For example, Knack and Keefer (1997), and
LaPorta et al. (1997) provide evidence that shows a linkage between trust and growth and
the impact trust has on the eﬀective management of large organizations, respectively. A
similar construct used to measure life-satisfaction is that of subjective well-being. Based
on the previous literature, subjective well-being is a good measure of overall well-being
(Krueger and Schkade (2008)) and is aﬀected by changes in real income and living standards
(Sacks et al. (2010)). Subjective well-being also is often used to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of
government policies on the target population.56
The signiﬁcance of trust on economic growth and the relationship between subjective well-
being and living standards are more meaningful for countries like Pakistan where citizens have
been exposed to severe militancy, conﬂict and violence in recent decades. Exposure to conﬂict
aﬀects both the general levels of trust (Glaeser et al. (2000), Alesina and LaFerrara (2002))
and subjective well-being (Frey et al. (2009), Dolan and Metcalfe (2012)). In this paper, I
ﬁrst evaluate how exposure to violence aﬀects these measures for the citizens in the province
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) in Pakistan, which has been aﬀected the most by conﬂict
and radical militancy in the country. Secondly, the eﬀectiveness of certain reforms that were
recently introduced in the province are also analyzed. The purpose of these reforms was to
strengthen human and property rights, increase local government transparency and improve
56For example, Frijters et al. (2004) studied the eﬀects of German re-uniﬁcation on subjective well-being
in East Germany and Gruber and Mullainathan (2005) evaluated the impact of cigarette taxes on subjective
well-being of smokers.
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service delivery. The motivation for these provincial reforms was to facilitate economic
growth and enhance trust in the local government institutions, which has the potential to
reduce militancy and radicalism. However given the short time-horizon, these outcomes
could not be measured directly. Instead, the focus of the study is on the impact of these
reforms on political and societal trust.
For the analysis, survey data was collected from a cross-section of the adult population
in KPK. Information was collected using longer in-person questionnaires, which were ad-
ministered by the University of Peshawar, as well as a shorter set of questions that were
administered by a robot caller. The ﬁrst wave of the data collection was conducted dur-
ing the fall of 2014 and the second wave was initiated approximately six months later. A
targeted messaging campaign that informed the citizens about the new government reforms
along with the underlying motivation for these reforms was held in-between the two waves.
The policies could not be randomized, however, the awareness with regards to the policies
was randomized. Thus, the assumption of this strategy is that by making the government
reforms salient through these messages, I was able to (exogenously) shock beliefs about prop-
erty rights and the transparency of local institutions. The messaging campaign was started
in December 2014. Robot-calls were delivered to a subset of all the cellular phone numbers
in randomly selected tehsils throughout KPK.57
The empirical results show that exposure to violence and conﬂict have a negative and a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on general levels of trust and subjective well-being, whereas violence has
a positive eﬀect on civil services and district courts (local formal institutions). Empirical
results provide mixed evidence on the eﬃcacy of the messaging campaigns. The messages
had a positive impact on the levels of trust, subjective well-being and opinions about the
quality of local services. However, the eﬀects are signiﬁcant only for the general levels of
trust and perceptions about the local governance, and insigniﬁcant for subjective well-being.
However, when the eﬀects are allowed to diﬀer between those who were more exposed to
57A tehsil is an administrative unit in Pakistan. Usually it consists of a city/town that serves as the
administrative center and additional towns and villages. It is similar to a county in the US.
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violence relative to others, some of these eﬀects become more deﬁnite. The impacts of these
awareness campaigns on the satisfaction with the local governmental services and conﬁdence
in the justice system provide an important ﬁrst step in rebuilding and restoring the overall
levels of trust in the region.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II describes the study design and
the messaging campaigns, Section III discusses the survey results and determinants of trust
and Section IV concludes.
II. Study design and the messaging campaign
The purpose of this study is two-fold. Firstly, I examine how exposure to violence and conﬂict
impacts (i) general levels of trust; (ii) attitudes towards public and religious institutions; and
(iii) subjective well-being. A number of studies have established that exposure to conﬂict
impairs general level of trust (see Glaeser et al. (2000), Alesina and LaFerrara (2002)) and
well-being (see Frey et al. (2009), Dolan and Metcalfe (2012)). However, these questions have
not been explored in the context of conﬂict-prone regions like Pakistan, KPK in particular.
In KPK households have been exposed to extreme levels of violence, conﬂict and militancy in
the last two decades. Secondly, I analyzed whether targeted messages, which were designed
to make salient certain government reforms in the province, aﬀected levels of trust, conﬁdence
in institutions, political trust and measures of well-being. The reforms were introduced to
increase government transparency, improve service delivery and sustain property and human
rights. As noted by the previous literature, the outcomes of interest are important as they
are integral for economic development and growth in the region.
For the analysis, an in-person survey was designed that was conducted in randomly
selected villages throughout KPK. Appendix B contains a copy of the in-person survey. These
surveys were conducted in two waves by the University of Peshawar. The data collection
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for the ﬁrst wave was accomplished by October 2014 and the second wave was completed
by April 2015. Messaging campaigns were held in-between the two waves. Table 24 lists the
villages in KPK where the in-person survey was administered by the number of surveys in
each village. The table also indicates whether a village was randomly assigned to receive
cellular messages. In total, 3,741 surveys were administered in 34 villages (10 urban and 24
rural) located in 8 tehsils in the province. 1,823 of the total surveys were done in the 1st
wave and 1,918 surveys were conducted during the 2nd wave.
To expand the scope of the data collection eﬀorts and the analysis, a shorter survey (see
Appendix C) was organized using robot callers. The phone surveys allowed us to interview
citizens that were unreachable for the in-person survey due to the military operations against
insurgents in those areas. Table 25 lists the tehsils in KPK that received the phone survey.
Table 25 also contains an indicator of whether the in-person surveys were conducted in these
tehsils and whether a particular tehsil received the cellular messages or not. The ﬁnal phone
survey sample for KPK includes data from 30,473 individuals drawn from 46 tehsils. 15,005
of these phone surveys were done in the 1st wave and 15,468 were conducted during the 2nd
wave. Of the 46 tehsils included in the phone survey, 8 tehsils included villages that were
sampled as part of the in-person survey eﬀorts.
Reforms and messages in KPK
The focus of the messaging campaigns in KPK was on three reforms that were recently
implemented by the provincial government: (i) the Right to Information (RTI) Act; (ii) the
Right to Services (RTS) Act; and (iii) an e-Grievance Redressal System established as part
of the Peshawar High Court. The RTI Act was passed by the provincial government in
October 2013 and accepted by the governor of KPK in November. The objective of the RTI
was to provide access to the citizens to the information in the government departments and
therefore increase transparency and accountability of the government. Under the Act, an
electronic platform was developed for citizens to submit requests for public information and
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Table 24: List of villages with in-person surveys in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Tehsil Message
type
Village Wave 1 Wave 2
Buner RTI Agarai 50 49
Sura 49 48
Charorai 50 49
Nagrai 50 48
Battagram RTI Ajmera 44 49
Mastuj RTI, RTS Charun 53 50
Kohat RTI, PHC Urban 5 50 55
Jerma 50 56
Billitang 49 55
Shah Pur 50 55
Balakot RTI Balakot 48 62
Mansehra PHC Masehra City 67 68
Dodyal 58 67
Bufa 60 52
Tangi  Dhkakki 51 50
Tangi Bazar 47 50
Mandani 49 50
Puran RTI, RTS,
PHC
Puran 51 48
Peshawar RTI, PHC Tehkal 61 59
Gulbahar 60 60
Gulahan Rehman 60 60
Faqirabad 60 60
Gulberg 60
Dalazaq 60 60
Afhan Colony 60 60
Pawakay 61 61
Qisa Khwani 60 60
Palosai 61 59
Bazik Khel 56 59
Safaid Dary 60 59
Achini 58 60
Ashpando 60 60
Surizai Payan 58 60
Musa Zai 58 60
Notes: The table shows the list of villages by waves where the in-person surveys were conducted.
The ﬁrst wave was completed in October 2014 and the second wave was completed in April 2015.
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Table 25: List of tehsils with phone surveys in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Tehsil Message type Wave 1 Wave 2
Aali RTI, PHC 74 74
Abbotabad RTI, RTS, PHC 836 836
Alpuri RTI 47 47
B. Daud Shah RTI, RTS, PHC 410 410
Balakot RTI 35 35
Bannu RTS, PHC 453 453
Battagram RTI 38 38
Besham RTS 52 52
Bunner RTS 195 195
Chakisar PHC 35 35
Charsada PHC 1,067 1,067
Chitral RTI, RTS, PHC 36 36
D.I. Khan RTS, PHC 395 395
Dassu RTI 37 37
Dir PHC 609 609
F. R. Kaladhaka RTS 31 31
Ghazi PHC 8 8
Hangu RTS 36 36
Haripur  698 698
Havalian RTI, RTS 75 75
Jandool RTI, RTS, PHC 49 49
Karak RTI, RTS 208 208
Kohat RTI, PHC 409 409
Kulachi RTI, PHC 409 409
Lahore RTI, RTS 37 37
Lakki  257 257
Mansehra PHC 297 297
Mardan RTI, RTS, PHC 1,532 1,532
Martoong  25 25
Mastuj RTI, RTS 41 41
Matta RTI, PHC 31 31
Nowshera RTS, PHC 816 816
Oghi  271 271
Paharpur RTI 409 409
Palas RTS 25 25
Pattan PHC 37 37
Peshawar RTI, PHC 3,220 3,683
Puran RTI, RTS, PHC 36 36
Sam Ranizai RTS, PHC 457 457
Swabi RTS, PHC 284 284
Swat RTI 483 483
Takht Bai RTI, RTS 106 106
Takht-e-Nusrati RTS, PHC 257 257
Tank RTS 65 65
Tangi  - -
Temergara RTI, RTS 52 52
Wari  25 25
Total 15,005 15,468
Notes: The table shows the list of villages by waves where the phone surveys were conducted. The
ﬁrst wave was completed in October 2014 and the second wave was completed in April 2015.
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an independent statutory body was created to oversee these requests and ensure that these
requests are processed in a timely manner.58 The RTS Act was passed by the provincial
assembly in January 2014 and approved by the governor in the same month. The goal of the
RTS was to improve public service delivery. There are time limits and other requirements
under the Act for the delivery of public services. Failure to meet these guidelines and
requirements could result in penalties for the civil servants. The RTS Act also contains
a grievance feedback mechanism, which allows the citizens to ﬁle complaints if they are
not satisﬁed or believe that a public servant failed to meet the guidelines.59 Finally, the e-
Grievance Redressal System was established by the human rights directorate of the Peshawar
High Court in aﬃliation with the World Bank. The purpose of the System is to provide an
on-line platform to the citizens to ﬁle complaints and grievances regarding violations of basic
human and property rights. The System allows the citizens to track the progress of their
complaints and receive feedback on the ultimate dispensation.60. Hence, all these three
reforms intend to strengthen human/property rights and increase transparency in all the
governmental sectors.
To inform the population on these reforms, a series of targeted messages were designed
in association with the support of the provincial government in KPK. These messages were
disseminated via robot-calls to randomly selected cellular phone users in the province. The
message on the RTI robot-call, for instance, in part reads as follows:
...Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's RTI laws and commission allow you to gather infor-
mation from any government oﬃce in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. A public com-
mission oﬃcer has been appointed in every governmental department who will
provide information about the particular department. For more information...go
to www.kprti.gov.pk. Thank you...
58For more on the RTI Act, see http://www.kprti.gov.pk/rti/index.php
59On the RTS website it states that a potential outcome of this reform is to establish the much needed
trust between the citizens and the state. For more on the RTS Act, see http://www.rts.gkp.pk/rtsweb/
60For more on the e-Grievance Redressal System, see http://www.hrdphc.com/index.php
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The initial robot-call was immediately followed by a Short Message Service (SMS). These
messages varied in composition but included language that was centered on three funda-
mental motifs: (i) the law provides everyone the right to know the management of the
governmental system; (ii) the law was designed to enhance government transparency, and
(iii) the law ascertains that the government is working for the citizens.
For the RTS messaging, the robot-calls were followed by two subsequent rounds of SMS
messages. The RTS message in part reads as follows:
...government has passed the Right to Services Act 2014 which now ensures that
citizens should get certain services as a right without inconvenience or facing
coercion...You can contribute to strengthening this system by answering a few
short questions regarding your use of any of these services...
The recipient of the RTS message was also informed about the list of services covered under
the Act and was asked to press 1 if they had used any of the listed services in the last three
months and whether they would like to give feedback on those services. Those who did press
1 were sent a follow-up text inquiring about the service/s accessed and their experiences.
Finally, the messaging campaign for the e-Grievance System followed a procedure similar
to the RTI robot-calls. At the end of the call, the recipient was asked about violation of their
rights and interest in using the new service. In particular, the recipient was asked if they
believe (i) their rights were violated and they would like to use the new service; (ii) their
rights were violated and they would not like to use the new service; and (iii) their rights
were not violated and hence they do not want to use the new service currently. A random
sample of cellular phone users received a robot-call that in part reads as follows:
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...The High Court has established a system where you can record your grievance
if you feel your basic rights have been violated. You can record your grievance
by visiting the website....
Why targeted messages?
The goals of these reforms was to increase transparency and eﬃciency of the local govern-
ment, strengthen the rights of the individuals, and provide the citizens with a platform to
report and track complaints if they believed their rights were being violated. For the analy-
sis, a series of targeted messages that informed the citizens about new provincial government
reforms were designed to inform the public about these reforms. These messages were sent
out via text messages and/or robot-calls to a random sample of cellular phone users in KPK.
The timing of the message delivery was between the 1st and the 2nd waves of the in-person
and phone surveys. Given the study design, one can implement a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
approach to study the impact of these messages on the levels of trust and attitudes towards
institutions. A number of studies in recent years have investigated the eﬀects of targeted
messages and normative appeals on various behavioral outcomes. For example, studies have
looked at energy and water conservation (Allcott (2011), Ferraro and Price (2013)), charita-
ble contributions (Croson and Shang (2009), DellaVigna et al. (2012)) and tax compliance
(Kleven et al. (2011), Hallsworth et al. (2014)). The assumption of this study is that these
awareness campaigns exogenously shock beliefs about the strength and reliability of local
institutions and individual rights and hence, the study design will allows us to identify the
importance of these beliefs on the general levels of political and societal trust.
Experimental design
Before the data collection eﬀorts, the tehsils in KPK were randomly assigned either to a
control group that received no messages about the reforms or were assigned to one of the
93
seven treatment groups that received the messages about some subset of the reforms. The
messaging campaign was started in the 2nd week of December and continued through the
remainder of the month. Table D.1 in the Appendix D lists the tehsils that were assigned
to these treatment/control groups. The table also provides 2013 tehsil population data and
the number of individuals that received the messages of a given type. Our partners in the
governance support had limited budget for the messaging campaign and this is reﬂected in
the small fraction of residents in any tehsil that actually received a message. For example,
1.8 percent of the total population in Swat received the RTI message. In the treatment
groups, if the residents were informed about more than one reform, the recipients of any one
message represented independent draws from the set of known cellular phone numbers for
recipients in the tehsil. For example, in Lahore, 1.7 percent of the total population received
the RTI information whereas another 1.2 percent were informed about the RTS Act. Hence,
there is variation in both the intensity of the treatment within a tehsil and the range of
reforms that were publicized during the awareness campaigns.
III. Survey results and the determinants of trust
General levels of trust
First, the eﬀects of violence and the impact of awareness campaigns on the overall levels of
trust and beliefs about the intentions of others are evaluated. For the attitudinal measures
of trust and intentions, the previous literature (Alesina and LaFerrara (2002), Glaeser et al.
(2000)) is followed and the focus is on three questions in the in-person survey. General levels
of trust are based on responses to the following two questions:
1. Would you say that most people can be trusted or you cannot be too careful
when dealing with strangers?
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2. Do you agree with this statement: when dealing with strangers, one is better-
oﬀ using caution before trusting them?
The ﬁrst question is binary, where most people can be trusted takes a values of 1 and
cannot be too careful takes a value of 0. The second question is on a Likert-scale where
strongly agree takes a value of 5 and strongly disagree takes a values of 1.61 Beliefs
about intentions is based on the following question from the in-person survey, which reads
as follows:
3. Would you say that most of the time people are trying to be helpful, or they
are mostly looking out for themselves?
The question above is also binary, where most people are helpful takes a value of 1 and
are mostly looking out for themselves takes a value of 0.
To measure exposure to violence, an indicator for violence is developed, which is based
on question # 45 in the in-person survey and reads as follows:
How much violence have you or a member of your family witnessed over the past
year?
The question above is on a scale of 1 to 10, where witnessed extreme amount of violence
takes a value of 10 and have not witnessed any violence takes a value of 0. These responses
were normalized to generate a standardized scale that has a standard normal distribution.
61The Likert-scale questions on a scale of 1 to 5 were dichotomized such that responses greater than or
equal to 4 were assigned a value of one and responses less than 4 were assigned a value of zero. Variations
of such dichotomizations produced similar results.
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These responses were converted as vNi =
vi−v
σv
, where vi is the response to the violence
question by individual i, and v and σv are the mean and standard deviation of the responses,
respectively.62 To study the impact of exposure to violence the focus is on the responses in
the ﬁrst wave and the linear probability models of the following form are estimated:
yi = α + βv
N
i + γXi + εi (21)
where yi are the i
th individual's responses to the trust questions, vNi is the normalized
measure of violence, Xi is a vector of household characteristics and εi is the idiosyncratic
error term.63
Table 26 shows the results of model (21) for the trust questions. As the results show,
exposure to violence lowers trust. Respondents that were exposed to violence are 6.1 per-
centage points less likely to report that people can be trusted. This result is consistent
with Alesina and LaFerrara (2002) where they showed that exposure to trauma erodes trust.
Exposure to violence has a similar impact on the question about intentions of others. Those
that were more exposed to violence were 5 percentage points less likely to report that others
are helpful. Both these responses are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level using a test
of proportions. On the question with regards to usage of caution, the eﬀect of violence is
positive, which implies that respondents that were more exposed to violence used greater
caution when dealing with strangers. However, the coeﬃcient of interest is insigniﬁcant: the
diﬀerences in responses on the usage of caution with strangers for those who were exposed
to violence relative to those who were not, is on average centered around 0.
Having shown than exposure to violence aﬀects general levels of trust and beliefs about
intentions negatively, the eﬀects of the experimental interventions on the same outcomes is
explored. The repeated nature of the in-person surveys is exploited and the fact that only
62Other indicators for exposure to violence were also considered such as (i) responses greater than the
mean (vi ≥ v) and (ii) responses greater than one-standard deviation above the mean (vi ≥ v + σv). The
results are not aﬀected when these indicators were used to deﬁne exposure to violence.
63To estimate how exposure to violence aﬀects general levels of trust, (i) probit/order probit models, and
(ii) transformations of the Likert-scale questions to a standard normal distribution were also considered. The
qualitative nature of the results relative to (21) remain unchanged with these two strategies.
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Table 26: The eﬀect of exposure to conﬂict on trust
People can be trusted People are helpful Be careful w/ strangers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposure to
violence
-0.061*** -0.060*** -0.050*** -0.048*** 0.017 0.012
(0.023) (0.023) (0.018) (0.015) (0.024) (0.022)
Demographics X X X
No. of observations 1765 1646 1740 1624 1771 1652
R2 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02
Notes: The questions represented by columns 1 - 4 are binary. The question represented by columns
5 - 6 was asked on a scale of 1 - 5 and was dichotomized by setting the values ≥ 4 to 1. Demographic
controls included in the regressions are: age, education, ethnicity, gender, home ownership and
marital status. Standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level
a subset of the villages in the sample received the treatment (messages). A diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences model is employed that allows us to extract a causal impact of the messaging
campaigns and keep all other unobservables, which could inﬂuence the outcomes of inter-
est, constant. In particular, a series of linear probability models of the following form are
estimated:
yit = α + βTi + δWt + θ (Ti ×Wt) + γXit + ξit (22)
where yi is the response of the individual i in wave t, Ti is an indicator that takes a value of 1
if the respondent resides in a village that received the cellular messages,Wt is a wave dummy,
which equal 1 for the post-intervention period, Xit are demographic variables and ξi is the
idiosyncratic error term.64 To account for correlation within a village, the standard errors
are clustered at the village level. The eﬀect of the treatment on the associated outcome of
interest is captured by θ.
Empirical results for trust and beliefs about intentions are contained in Table 27. The
results suggest that the messaging campaigns had a positive impact on the levels of trust and
beliefs about others. Respondent who resided in treated villages were 31.7 percentage point
64These models were also estimated using (i) probit/order probit models, and (ii) transforming the Likert-
scale questions to a standard normal. The qualitative nature of the results relative to (22) remain unchanged
with these two strategies.
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less likely to report that others could be trusted in the ﬁrst wave of the in-person survey
relative to the respondents residing in the control villages. However in the post-intervention
period, respondents from the treated villages are 11 percentage points more likely to report
that others could be trusted when compared to the control group. Moreover, this diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences result is signiﬁcant at the p < 0.01 level. Similar results are observed for beliefs
about intentions of others. As noted in column 3, respondents from the treated villages were
13.4 percentage points less likely to report that others are helpful in the pre-intervention
period, relative to the respondents in the control villages. However, this diﬀerence decreases
by more than 81 percent in the post-intervention period and this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the
p < 0.10 level. On the use of caution with strangers, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcient
in the 5th column is negative suggesting that in the post-intervention period, respondents
believed that it is less important to use caution when dealing with strangers. However, this
coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant. Collectively, these results suggest that the awareness of these
new reforms reduced the impacts of conﬂict and violence on societal trust.
I also explore whether the eﬀects are more prominent for those who were more exposed
to violence relative to others. To estimate this, the model given by (22) is augmented by
including an indicator for exposure to violence (vNi ) and a triple interaction term that equals
1 for a respondent living in the treated village who was exposed to violence and was surveyed
in the post-intervention period. In particular, the following regressions are estimated:
yit = α+βTi+δWt+λv
N
i +θ (Ti ×Wt)+τ
(
vNi ×Wt
)
+ρ
(
vNi × Ti
)
+φ
(
vNi × Ti ×Wt
)
+γXit+µit
(23)
Since vNi has a standard normal distribution with mean 0, the average treatment eﬀect is
given by θ. The results of model (23) are given in columns 2, 4 and 6. The results indicate
that the treatment had a smaller eﬀects on the attitudinal measures of trust on those who
were more exposed to violence. Respondents who were more exposed to violence, on average
were 13 percentage points less likely to report that others could be trusted in the post-
intervention period relative to those who were less exposed to violence. Additionally, this
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Table 27: The impact of messaging campaigns on general levels of trust
People can be trusted People are helpful Be careful w/ strangers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wave 2
-0.631*** -0.591*** -0.237*** -0.214*** 0.374*** 0.381***
(0.065) (0.091) (0.056) (0.055) (0.104) (0.084)
Treatment
-0.317*** -0.272*** -0.134** -0.107* -0.114 -0.110
(0.047) (0.062) (0.060) (0.063) (0.078) (0.070)
Wave 2 × Treatment 0.427*** 0.386*** 0.108* 0.081 -0.171 -0.176*
(0.078) (0.100) (0.066) (0.065) (0.111) (0.093)
Exposure to violence
-0.197*** -0.116** -0.052
(0.079) (0.056) (0.055)
Exposure to violence
× Wave 2
0.199*** 0.066** 0.001
(0.063) (0.031) (0.028)
Exposure to violence
× Treatment
0.154* 0.077 0.072
(0.082) (0.058) (0.058)
Exposure to violence
× Wave 2 ×
Treatment
-0.131* -0.012 -0.020
(0.069) (0.037) (0.038)
No. of observations 3569 3546 3546 3524 3577 3552
R2 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.08
Notes: The questions represented by columns 1 - 4 are binary. The question represented by columns
5 - 6 was asked on a scale of 1 - 5 and was dichotomized by setting the values ≥ 4 to 1. Demographic
controls included in the regressions are: age, education, ethnicity, gender, home ownership and
marital status. Standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level
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diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. From a policy perspective, these heterogeneous
eﬀects are notable given the prior literature that has noted that lower levels of trust are
associated with higher crime rates (Sampson et al. (1999), Kawachi et al. (1998)).
Satisfaction with the government and trust in institutions
A fundamental motivation underlying these reforms was to enhance political trust and
improve service delivery. Next, the above analyses are repeated for the local institutions.
In order to estimate the eﬀects of exposure to violence on conﬁdence towards institutions,
model (21) is executed for three institutions in particular and these are: (i) the civil services,
(ii) the district court, and (iii) the mosque. Respondents were asked on a Likert-scale of 1 to
10 about their attitudes towards these institutions where very high conﬁdence takes a value
of 10 and no conﬁdence takes a value of 0.65 Exposure to violence is again measured by
vNi , which is produced by normalizing question # 45. Again only the 1
st wave cross-sectional
data is used for model (21) and the results of these regressions are given by Table 28. As the
results show, exposure to violence has a positive eﬀect on civil services and district courts
(formal local institutions). Conﬁdence towards institutions increased by 1 to 2 percentage
points for respondents that were more exposed to violence. However, these coeﬃcients are
not statistically signiﬁcant. On the other hand, conﬁdence towards mosques (informal local
institutions) is declining in violence. On average, increase in exposure to violence reduced
conﬁdence towards mosque by 5 percentage points. This result is noteworthy, particularly,
from a policy perspective. As conﬂict worsens in a region, trust and conﬁdence in formal
institutions increases.
The impact of the messaging schemes on trust in these public and religious institutions
is also explored. Using data from both waves of the in-person survey, the responses to the
65The Likert-scale questions on a scale of 1 to 10 were dichotomized such that responses greater than or
equal to 7 were assigned a value of one and responses less than 7 were assigned a value of zero. Variations
of such dichotomizations produced similar results.
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Table 28: The eﬀect of exposure to conﬂict on conﬁdence in local institutions
Civil services Mosque District court
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposure to
violence
0.015 0.016 -0.042*** -0.043*** 0.010 0.007
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.020) (0.019)
Demographics X X X
No. of observations 1766 1650 1716 1602 1754 1637
R2 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.03
Notes: The questions represented by columns 1 - 6 were asked on a scale of 1 - 10 and were
dichotomized by setting the values ≥ 7 to 1. Demographic controls included in the regressions are:
age, education, ethnicity, gender, home ownership and marital status. Standard errors clustered at
the village level are reported in parentheses
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level
conﬁdence questions as the dependent variable are used in the econometric model given by
(22). Empirical results of these models are given in Table 29. The results suggest that the
messaging campaign increased conﬁdence in local institutions but the result is signiﬁcant
only for district courts. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcient in column 5 implies that
there was a 0.83 standard deviation increase in conﬁdence towards district courts after the
messaging campaigns. The awareness campaigns also had negligible eﬀects on conﬁdence
towards the federal government. The null eﬀects of the campaign towards the mosque and
the federal government are not surprising as the reforms were intended for the public oﬃces
at the provincial level. Secondly, these results also conﬁrm that the diﬀerential eﬀects for the
treated villages compared to the control villages in the post-intervention period are being
driven by the messaging campaigns and are not due to unobserved shocks at the village
level. Lastly, political trust is learned behavior that captures attitudes across wide array of
services that are formed over a long time horizon (Ridley (1997), Newton (2007)). Thus, the
awareness campaigns did have small eﬀects on political trust and conﬁdence towards local
institutions but rebuilding and restoration of such trust requires time.
To examine the eﬀects of the messaging campaign on satisfaction with public institutions
and service delivery, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach is utilized on the following three
questions:
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1. I am satisﬁed with the quality of services provided by the political adminis-
tration.
2. Over the past year, the provincial government has taken eﬀorts that have
improved the system of justice in your district.
3. Over the past year, the government has taken actions to improve the gover-
nance system in your region.
On these questions, the respondents were asked to indicate on a scale of 1 to 10, whether
they agreed with these statement where strongly agree is equivalent to 10 and strongly
disagree takes a value of 0. Empirical results of these regressions are given by Table
30 and suggest that the messaging campaign had a positive impact on the responses to
these questions, particularly regarding perceptions about quality of public services. The
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcient in column 1 corresponds to 0.86 standard deviation in-
crease in satisfaction towards quality of services provided by the political administration.
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcient in columns 3 and 5 are smaller in magnitude and
insigniﬁcant. The triple interaction coeﬃcients columns 4 and 6 indicate that the eﬀect of
the treatment on perceptions about justice and governance diminishes as violence increases.
Given the prior literature that has formed an association of political trust with conﬁdence
in public institutions and perceptions about quality and performance of these institutions
(Hetherington (2005), Newton (2007), Hutchison and Johnson (2011)), the impacts that the
messaging campaign had on these perceptions about governance is important from a policy
perspective. Such changes represent a necessary ﬁrst step in reconstructing and restoring
trust in the state and local public institutions.
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Table 30: The impact of messaging campaigns on satisfaction with governmental services
Quality of services Improvement in justice Improvement in governance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wave 2
-0.303* -0.308** -0.201 -0.194 -0.159 -0.154
(0.157) (0.141) (0.203) (0.201) (0.200) (0.197)
Treatment
-0.191 -0.200 -0.181 -0.180 -0.141 -0.141
(0.144) (0.133) (0.164) (0.158) (0.171) (0.170)
Wave 2 × Treatment 0.378** 0.386*** 0.223 0.224 0.117 0.120
(0.167) (0.152) (0.206) (0.204) (0.205) (0.202)
Exposure to violence
0.000 -0.044 0.031**
(0.061) (0.028) (0.014)
Exposure to violence
× Wave 2
-0.023 0.094*** 0.016**
(0.063) (0.019) (0.008)
Exposure to violence
× Treatment
0.008 0.083** 0.075***
(0.065) (0.036) (0.024)
Exposure to violence
× Wave 2×
Treatment
0.002 -0.122*** -0.041*
(0.071) (0.030) (0.023)
No. of observations 3508 3478 3579 3547 3564 3533
R2 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
Notes: The questions represented by columns 1 - 6 were asked on a scale of 1 - 10 and were
dichotomized by setting the values ≥ 7 to 1. Demographic controls included in the regressions are:
age, education, ethnicity, gender, home ownership and marital status. Standard errors clustered at
the village level are reported in parentheses
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level
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Happiness and measures of subjective well-being
Next, the impacts of exposure to violence and the messaging campaigns on measures of
subjective well-being are explored. Previous literature has established that subjective well-
being is a good measure of well-being (Krueger and Schkade (2008)) and has been utilized to
estimate policy eﬀectiveness. For example, Frijters et al. (2004) studied the eﬀects of German
re-uniﬁcation on subjective well-being in East Germany and Gruber and Mullainathan (2005)
evaluated the impact of cigarette taxes on subjective well-being of smokers. Prior literature
has also established that conﬂict aﬀects subjective well-being negatively (Frey et al. (2009),
Dolan and Metcalfe (2012)). I extend on this literature and explore the eﬀects of exposure
to violence and the awareness campaigns on measures of subjective well-being in KPK.
Exposure to violence is again deﬁned by vNi . The focus is on the following two questions
from the in-person survey:
1. How satisﬁed are you with the ﬁnancial situation of your household?
2. All things considered, how satisﬁed are you with your life as a whole these
days?
On these questions, the respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 10 their level of
satisfaction, where very satisﬁed is equivalent to 10 and very unsatisﬁed takes a value of
0. The responses to these questions are used as the dependent variable in the econometric
models.
The results for model (21) with measures of subjective well-being as the dependent vari-
able are given by Table 31. Similar to the ﬁndings in the previous literature, exposure to
violence and conﬂict have a negative eﬀect on subjective well-being. The coeﬃcient of in-
terest is negative and signiﬁcant for both these questions. Those that were more exposed to
violence were 8 to 9 percentage points less likely to report that they are satisﬁed with their
life and 7 percentage points less likely to indicate that they are satisﬁed with their ﬁnancial
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Table 31: The eﬀect of exposure to conﬂict on subjective well-being
Satisfaction w/ ﬁnancial situation Satisfaction w/ life as a whole
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exposure to
violence
-0.079*** -0.075*** -0.090*** -0.082***
(0.031) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029)
Demographics X X
No. of observations 1731 1618 1733 1618
R2 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.08
Notes: The questions represented by columns 1 - 4 were asked on a scale of 1 - 10 and were
dichotomized by setting the values ≥ 7 to 1. Demographic controls included in the regressions are:
age, education, ethnicity, gender, home ownership and marital status. Standard errors clustered at
the village level are reported in parentheses.
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level
situation. Both these responses are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level using a test of
proportions. Empirical results of model (22) with well-being measures as the dependent vari-
ables are given by Table 32. The results suggest that the awareness campaigns had a positive
but a negligible impact on subjective well-being. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcients in
columns 1 and 3 are approximately one-fourth of a standard deviation increase in satisfaction
with one's ﬁnancial situation and satisfaction with life, respectively. However, both these
coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant. En masse, these results suggest that the awareness campaigns
had a positive and a substantial impact on trust and conﬁdence in local institutions but did
not aﬀect life satisfaction signiﬁcantly.
An important robustness check - phone surveys
For a variety of reasons, the in-person survey results discussed above could be seen with
skepticism. Firstly, the surveys were done for a small subset of villages in KPK and include
observations from one control tehsil. Therefore, the unobserved shocks to the villages within
the control tehsil from the eﬀect of the awareness campaigns on villages within the treated
tehsils cannot be completely disentangled. Secondly, given the small sample sizes, there is
a possibility that the regression models may be under-powered and thus unable to detect
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Table 32: The impact of messaging campaigns on subjective well-being
Satisfaction w/ ﬁnancial situation Satisfaction w/ life as a whole
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wave 2
-0.049 -0.032 -0.049 -0.039
(0.161) (0.153) (0.157) (0.160)
Treatment
-0.246*** -0.219** -0.262*** -0.241**
(0.090) (0.085) (0.093) (0.096)
Wave 2 × Treatment 0.110 0.078 0.097 0.071
(0.169) (0.161) (0.166) (0.169)
Exposure to violence
-0.094*** -0.054
(0.023) (0.054)
Exposure to violence
× Wave 2 0.043** -0.004
(0.018) (0.070)
Exposure to violence
× Treatment 0.026 -0.025
(0.037) (0.063)
Exposure to violence
× Wave 2×
Treatment
-0.001 0.056
(0.045) (0.084)
No. of observations 3541 3518 3541 3518
R2 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.07
Notes: The questions represented by columns 1 - 4 were asked on a scale of 1 - 10 and were
dichotomized by setting the values ≥ 7 to 1. Demographic controls included in the regressions are:
age, education, ethnicity, gender, home ownership and marital status. Standard errors clustered at
the village level are reported in parentheses.
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level
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Table 33: Messaging campaigns and the telephone survey responses
Trusting others Satisfaction w/
local govt. services
Satisfaction w/ life
(1) (2) (3)
Wave 2 -0.495*** -0.337*** -0.225***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.017)
Treatment -0.072*** -0.081*** -0.055***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Wave 2 × Treatment 0.289*** 0.232*** -0.016
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
No. of observations 29535 29385 29535
R2 0.15 0.15 0.14
Notes: The questions represented by columns 1 - 3 were asked on a scale of 1 - 5 and were di-
chotomized by setting the values ≥ 4 to 1. Demographic controls included in the regressions are:
age, education, gender, and marital status. Standard errors clustered at the tehsil level are reported
in parentheses.
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; * signiﬁcant at 10% level
notable changes. Lastly, the in-person surveys could suﬀer from subject-to-desirability bias
or other eﬀects that could reﬂect characteristics of the surveyor instead of the respondent.
To address these concerns, a phone survey was also administered that included three
questions of interest:
1. Do you trust others?
2. Are you satisﬁed with the quality of the services provided by the local political
administration?
3. How satisﬁed are you with your life these days?
These questions were asked on a ﬁve-point Likert scale. The phone surveys did not
include any questions regarding exposure to violence and thus I am restricted to the baseline
econometric model given by (22), where the responses to these questions are the dependent
variables. Moreover, in the phone surveys the respondents are observed at the tehsil level
and therefore the standard errors are clustered at the tehsil level instead of the village level.
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The empirical results with the phone survey data are given in Table 33. The results
given by the table are consistent with the earlier in-person survey results. The awareness
campaigns had a positive impact on trust and satisfaction with governance. For instance, the
messaging campaign caused a three-ﬁfth of a standard deviation increase in trust towards
others and a 0.45 of a standard deviation increase in satisfaction with the quality of services
of the local government. Both these eﬀects are signiﬁcant at the p < 0.01 level. The eﬀect of
the awareness campaign on satisfaction with life and hence well-being was insigniﬁcant. The
eﬀects with the phone based survey data are qualitatively similar to the eﬀects produced
with the in-person survey data and thus the concerns of the in-person survey raised earlier
could be ignored. The awareness campaigns had a sizable eﬀect on general levels of trust
and quality of the services provided by the government under both, the in-person and the
phone surveys and also highlight the advantage of including the phone survey results as an
important robustness check.
IV. Conclusion
The purpose of this study is two-fold. Firstly, I explore how exposure to conﬂict and
violence aﬀects general levels of trust, attitudes toward local institutions and subjective
well-being. Prior literature has established that conﬂict has the potential to erode societal
and political trust, and hence create frictions in the system, which in turn hamper growth and
development. For the analysis, the target population is the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(KPK) in Pakistan, which has experienced severe militancy, conﬂict and violence in recent
years. Erosion of trust is particularly detrimental for countries like Pakistan, since it aﬀects
economic development in the region. Secondly, the eﬀects of targeted messages, which inform
the citizens of the region regarding new governmental reforms, on societal trust, conﬁdence
in institutions and life-satisfaction are also examined. The goals of these reforms was to
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increase government transparency, improve service delivery and strengthen property rights.
The underlying motivation for these provincial reforms was to enhance political trust in the
state and improve attitudes in the local government institutions, which have the potential
to reduce militancy and radicalism. A series of targeted messages were designed that make
salient these government reforms and their underlying motivation. These messages were
delivered to randomly selected cellular phone users via text messages and/or robot-calls.
For the analysis, an in-person survey was designed, which were conducted in randomly
selected villages before and after the messaging campaigns. The results suggest that exposure
to violence and conﬂict have negative eﬀects on general levels of trust and subjective well-
being, which is consistent with ﬁndings in the previous literature. Importantly, conﬂict
increases conﬁdence in formal local institutions relative to informal local institutions. Results
on the awareness campaigns suggest that the targeted messages did have a positive and a
signiﬁcant impact on societal trust and attitudes towards local institutions. Moreover, the
treatment had a larger eﬀect on societal trust among respondents who were relatively more
exposed to violence. As a placebo test, the awareness campaigns had no eﬀect on informal
institutions (religious institutions) or the federal government, since the reforms and the
messages were intended for the local public institutions. Finally, the awareness campaigns
had a negligible impact on subjective well-being and life satisfaction. To check the validity of
these results, a phone survey was also conducted before and after the awareness campaigns
in randomly selected villages. One of the advantage of the phone surveys over the in-person
surveys was the sample size plus those villages could be reached that were inaccessible for
the in-person interviews. Qualitatively, the results of the phone-survey data and the in-
person survey data are similar. These results are noteworthy particularly from a policy
perspective. The messaging campaigns had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the attitudinal measures
of trust and perceptions towards governance. Such changes represent a necessary ﬁrst step
in reconstructing and restoring societal and political trust in the state and the local public
institutions.
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Appendix A: Proof of the non-causal model in Chapter 1
Consider the following two simultaneous equations:
y1 = α + βx1 + δx2 + θ [x1 · x2] + ε (A.1)
y2 = a+ bx1 + cx+ d [x1 · x2] + µ (A.2)
where E (εµ) 6= 0 and E (x1ε) = E (x2ε) = E (x1µ) = E (x2µ) = 0. Let X1 = [1 x1],
X2 = [x2 x1 · x2], X = [X1 X2], A1 = [α β]′ and A2 = [δ θ]′. Given the orthogonal-
ity conditions, (A.1) and (A.2) can be estimated by OLS. By Frisch-Waugh-Lovell (FWL)
theorem:
Â2 =
(
X
′
2M1X2
)−1
X
′
2M1y1 (A.3)
where Mi = I−PXi = I−Xi(X′iXi)−1X′i, PXi is the projection matrix onto the space spanned
by the columns of Xi and X
′
iMi = 0.
66 ∂E(y1|X)
∂x2
= δ̂ + θ̂x1 = X1Â2. Call this T̂ ; this is the
estimated treatment eﬀect of x2. To estimate how ∂x2 is correlated with ŷ2, estimate the
following regression:
T̂ = pi0 + pi1ŷ2 + ω (A.4)
where ŷ2 = â+ b̂x1 + ĉ x2 + d̂ [x1 · x2], the structural parameters are estimated by OLS and
x2 =
N∑
i=1
x2i
N
. Let X3 = [1 ŷ2] and Π = [pi0 pi1]
′.
Π̂ =
(
X
′
3X3
)−1
X
′
3T̂
Π̂ =
(
X
′
3X3
)−1
X
′
3X1Â2
Π̂ =
(
X
′
3X3
)−1
X
′
3X1
(
X
′
2M1X2
)−1
X
′
2M1y1 (A.5)
Now consider the following model:
y1 = α + βx1 + pi0x2 + pi1 [ŷ2 · x2] + ξ (A.6)
66Mi is sometimes referred to as the residual-maker or the annihilator matrix and it creates residuals
out of y. Mi projects onto the orthogonal complement of the column space of Xi. Both Mi and PXi are
symmetric and idempotent.
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where X4 = [x2 ŷ2 · x2] and B = [pi0 pi1]′. By Frisch-Waugh-Lovell (FWL) theorem:
B̂ =
(
X
′
4M1X4
)−1
X
′
4M1y1 (A.7)
Note that the projection of y1 onto the space deﬁned by X1 will be the same for (A.1) and
(A.6). This implies that M2 = M4 : the partial eﬀects of X1 in (A.1) can be obtained when
the residuals from a regression of y1 on X2 are regressed on the set of residuals obtained when
each column of X1 is regressed on X2. The partial eﬀects of X1 in (A.6) can be obtained
when the residuals from a regression of y1 on X4 are regressed on the set of residuals obtained
when each column of X1 is regressed on X4. Hence, in both cases the residual-maker is the
same and M2 = M4. Given this result, the fact that X
′
iMi = 0 and using (A.5) and (A.7)
we have,
(
X
′
3X3
)−1
X
′
3X1
(
X
′
2M1X2
)−1
X
′
2M2M1y1 =
(
X
′
4M1X4
)−1
X
′
4M4M1y1(
X
′
3X3
)−1
X
′
3X1
(
X
′
2M1X2
)−1
X
′
2M2M1y1 =
(
X
′
4M1X4
)−1
X
′
4M2M1y1(
X
′
3X3
)−1
X
′
3X1
(
X
′
2M1X2
)−1
X
′
2M1y1 =
(
X
′
4M1X4
)−1
X
′
4M1y1
Π̂ = B̂ 
(A.8)
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Appendix B: Citizen trust survey conducted in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Q1. Age (years)
1 = 18 - 25
2 = 26 - 35
3 = 36 - 45
4 = 46 - 55
5 = 56 - 65
6 = 66 - 75
7 = Above 75
Q2. Gender
1 = male
2 = female
Q3. Marital status
1 = single
2 = married
3 = widowed
Q4. Number of children
Q5. Education
1 = none (illiterate)
2 = primary school
3 = middle school
4 = Secondary School Certiﬁcate (SSC) (high school)
5 = FA/FSc. (some college)
6 = BA/BSc.
7 = MA or higher
8 = Professional degree (MBBS, etc.)
9 = Dars-e-Nizami
Q6. Occupation
1 = private employee
2 = government employee
3 = agriculture
4 = self-employed
5 = housewife
6 = jobless
7 = student
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Q7. Ethnicity
1 = Pashtun
2 = Hindko
3 = Chitrali
4 = Gujjar
5 = Hazara
6 = Punjabi
7 = Other
Q8. What type of vehicle do you own?
1 = car
2 = motorcycle
3 = bicycle
4 = other motorized vehicle
5 = do not own a vehicle
Q9. Do you own a home?
1 = yes
2 = no
Q10. How much land do you own?  in Marla
Q11. Five-digit location code
Q12. Many people claim that FATA has a special status due to its tribal traditions; therefore,
it should have a special administrative arrangement. In your opinion, which of the following
administrative structures should FATA have?
1 = a political agent appointed by the government to maintain law and order and manage
development in the area
2 = an elected local government to management agency, town and village level develop-
ment
3 = a combination of a political agent and an elected local government
4 = don't know
5 = does not apply to me
6 = don't care
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Q13. Many people claim that FATA has a special status due to its tribal traditions; therefore,
it should have a special administrative arrangement. In your opinion, which of the following
administrative structures should FATA have?
1 = a separate province with all the provincial political and administrative structure
2 = merged into KPK.
3 = remain a federally administered special entity.
4 = don't know
5 = does not apply to me
6 = don't care
Q14. In your opinion, which of the following entities would best improve service delivery in
your district or agency?
1 = the government in Islamabad
2 = provincial government oﬃcials
3 = district or agency civil servants
4 = community based organization
5 = tribal councils
6 = don't know
7 = does not apply to me
8 = don't care
For Q15  Q31 use the following grid:
Q15. I am satisﬁed with the quality of the services provided by the political administration.
Q16. The government is responsible for creating employment opportunities.
Q17. The government does a good job of providing employment opportunities for the people
in your village.
Q18. The Oﬃce of the Political Agent is essential for development in FATA.
Q19. The Oﬃce of the Political Agent is essential for maintaining peace and security.
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Q20. The Oﬃce of the Political Agent is essential for ensuring that there is a fair and
transparent system of justice.
Q21. Over the past year, the Provincial government has made investments that have im-
proved the schools in your district.
Q22. Over the past year, the Provincial government has made investments that have im-
proved healthcare in your district.
Q23. Over the past year, the Provincial government has taken eﬀorts that have improved
the system of justice in your district.
Q24. Over the past year, government actions have improved the governance systems (like
the right to information) in your region.
Q25. Over the past year, Federal government investments have improved large scale infras-
tructure  we should give examples here - in your region
Q26. Over the past year, Provincial government investments have improved the local infras-
tructure in your region.
Q27. Over the past year, the Federal government has taken actions that have aided the
rehabilitation of IDPs in your region.
Q28. Over the past year, the Provincial government has taken actions that have aided the
rehabilitation of IDPs in your region.
Q29. Over the past year, the Federal government has taken eﬀorts that have helped to
control militancy in your region.
Q30. Over the past year, the Provincial government has taken actions that have aided the
rehabilitation of IDPs in your region.
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Q31. Over the past year, the local government has taken actions that have aided the reha-
bilitation of IDPs in your region.
Trust in institutions: for Q32  Q40 use the following grid:
Q32. Mosque (or other religious institution)
Q32b. Jirga
Q33. The municipality
Q34. Police
Q35. District or PA court
Q36. WAPDA
Q37. State media
Q38. Private media
Q39. Government in Islamabad
Q40. Civil services
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Q41. How satisﬁed are you with the ﬁnancial situation of your household?
Q42. All things considered, how satisﬁed are you with your life as a whole these days?
Q43. How interested would you say you are in politics?
Q44. How proud are you to be a Pakistani?
Q45. How much violence have you or a member of your family witnessed over the past year?
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Q46. How much violence have you or a member of your family witnessed over the past year?
Q47. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't
be too careful in dealing with people?
1 = most people can be trusted
2 = can't be too careful
Q48. Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance,
or would they try to be fair?
1 = would take advantage of you
2 = would try to be fair
Q49. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly
just looking out for themselves?
1 = try to be helpful
2 = looking out for themselves
Q50. I like to help others.
1 = strongly agree
2 = agree
3 = undecided
4 = disagree
5 = strongly disagree
Q51. I trust others.
1 = strongly agree
2 = agree
3 = undecided
4 = disagree
5 = strongly disagree
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Q52. When dealing with strangers, one is better oﬀ using caution before trusting them.
1 = strongly agree
2 = agree
3 = undecided
4 = disagree
5 = strongly disagree
Q53. How often have you beneﬁted from the generosity of a person you did not know?
1 = very often
2 = often
3 = sometimes
4 = rarely
5 = never
Q54. How often do you leave your house or car door unlocked?
1 = very often
2 = often
3 = sometimes
4 = rarely
5 = never
Q55. How often do you lend personal possessions other than money to others?
1 = very often
2 = often
3 = sometimes
4 = rarely
5 = never
Q56. Taking all things together, how satisﬁed are you with your life as a whole these days?
1 = very satisﬁed
2 = satisﬁed
3 = neutral
4 = unsatisﬁed
5 = very unsatisﬁed
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Q57. Overall, how satisﬁed are you with your life at home these days?
1 = very satisﬁed
2 = satisﬁed
3 = neutral
4 = unsatisﬁed
5 = very unsatisﬁed
Q58. Overall, how satisﬁed are you with your present job these days?
1 = very satisﬁed
2 = satisﬁed
3 = neutral
4 = unsatisﬁed
5 = very unsatisﬁed
Q59. Overall, how satisﬁed are you with your present health?
1 = very satisﬁed
2 = satisﬁed
3 = neutral
4 = unsatisﬁed
5 = very unsatisﬁed
Q60. Overall, how satisﬁed are you with the community in which you live these days?
1 = very satisﬁed
2 = satisﬁed
3 = neutral
4 = unsatisﬁed
5 = very unsatisﬁed
Q60b. In the past 3 months, did you or someone in your family go an entire day without
eating, for reason other than for religious fasting?
1 = yes
2 = no
Q60c. If yes to Q60b., for how many days?
Q60d. In the past 3 months, has there been a time when you or a dependent family member
needed health care but could not obtain it because of cost?
1 = yes
2 = no
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Q60e. In the past 3 months, has there been a time when you or a dependent family member
needed health care but could not obtain it because you were unable to travel?
1 = yes
2 = no
Q60f. If yes to Q60d. why you or a dependent family member was unable to travel to
obtain health care?
1 = patient too weak
2 = there was no vehicle available
3 = fare was too high
4 = route was problematic
5 = no one to accompany the patient
6 = other
Q60g. You could not access healthcare with which of the following?
1 = doctor
2 = nurse
3 = lady health visitor (LHV)
4 = Hakeem
5 = Dai
6 = other desi health provider
7 = village hospital
8 = district hospital
Q60h. Which of the following doctors have you visited in the past three month?
1 = doctor
2 = nurse
3 = lady health visitor (LHV)
4 = Hakeem
5 = Dai
6 = other desi health provider
Q61. Have you ever used internet or mobile to access any service oﬀered by government?
1 = yes (go to Q63.)
2 = no (go to Q62.)
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Q62. Why you have not used these internet or mobile services?
1 = I am illiterate
2 = I am shy/afraid of these services
3 = I don't know about these services
4 = I don't have internet or mobile to use these services
5 = I don't know how to use these services online or on mobile
6 = these services are too complicated
7 = these services are in English, which is diﬃcult
8 = I tried but mobile services/ website had too many problems
9 = these services are ridiculous
Q63. Where did you get to know about the above services?
1 = radio
2 = television
3 = newspaper
4 = government oﬃcial
5 = non-governmental organization (NGO)
6 = Hujra
7 = family or friend
8 = other
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Appendix C: Telephone survey conducted in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Q1. Taking all things together, how satisﬁed are you with your life as a whole these days?
1 = very satisﬁed
2 = satisﬁed
3 = neutral
4 = unsatisﬁed
5 = very unsatisﬁed
Q2. Do you trust others?
1 = strongly agree
2 = agree
3 = undecided
4 = disagree
5 = strongly disagree
Q3. Are you satisﬁed with the quality of the services provided by the local dist or political
administration?
1 = very satisﬁed
2 = satisﬁed
3 = neutral
4 = unsatisﬁed
5 = very unsatisﬁed
Q4. What is your age?
1 = Less than 15
2 = 15 - 18
3 = 19 - 25
4 = 26 - 35
5 = 36 - 45
6 = 46 - 55
7 = 56 - 65
8 = 66 - 75
9 = Above 75
Q5. Gender
1 = male
2 = female
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Q6. Marital status
1 = single
2 = married
3 = widowed
Q7. Number of children
Q5. Education
1 = none (illiterate)
2 = primary school
3 = middle school
4 = Secondary School Certiﬁcate (SSC) (high school)
5 = FA/FSc. (some college)
6 = BA/BSc.
7 = MA or higher
8 = engineer
9 = doctor
10 = lawyer
11 = chartered accountant
12 = other
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Appendix D: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa experimental study design
Table D.1: Experimental design: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa messaging campaign
Estimated
population in 2013
RTI calls
made
RTS calls
made
PHC calls
made
Control group
Tangi 411,000 0 0 0
Haripur 728,000 0 0 0
Lakki 790,000 0 0 0
Oghi 248,000 0 0 0
Martoong 930,000 0 0 0
Wari S/D 366,000 0 0 0
Treatment 1
Abbottabad 863,784 14,101 10,343 X
Chitral S/D 270,000 4,487 2,343 X
B. Daud Shah 156,000 3,278 2,210 X
Jandool 317,000 5,456 4,011 X
Mardan 1,661,000 27,297 18,375 X
Puran 130,000 2,324 1,983 X
Treatment 2
Havelian 297,216 5,003 3,922 0
Mastuj S/D 197,000 3,245 2,591 0
Karak 264,000 4,589 3,491 0
Temergara 885,000 16,331 10,611 0
Takht Bai 639,000 11,360 7,344 0
Lahore 475,000 8,178 5,734 0
Treatment 3
Bannu 1,033,000 0 11,639 X
D. I. Khan 832,000 0 10,429 X
Takht-e-Nasrati 284,000 0 3,781 X
Sam Ranizai 313,000 0 3,981 X
Nowshera 1,355,000 0 15,699 X
Swabi 1,133,000 0 13,243 X
Treatment 4
Allai 175,000 3,071 0 X
Kulachi 246,000 4,101 0 X
Kohat 919,000 15,570 0 X
Swat Ranizai 439,000 7,709 0 X
Peshawar 3,452,000 56,785 0 X
Matta 410,000 6,965 0 X
Treatment 5
Battagram 267,000 4,540 0 0
Paharpur 319,000 5,677 0 0
Dassu S/D 189,000 3,489 0 0
Balakot 293,000 5,421 0 0
Alpuri 277,000 4,501 0 0
Swat 1,680,000 30,844 0 0
Table D.1 (continued): Experimental design: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa messaging campaign
Estimated
population in 2013
RTI calls
made
RTS calls
made
PHC calls
made
Treatment 6
Tank 382,000 0 4,862 0
Besham 101,000 0 1,582 0
Buner 904,000 0 10,874 0
Hangu 514,000 0 6,102 0
Palas S/D 215,000 0 2,891 0
F. R. Kaladhaka 338,000 0 4,211 0
Treatment 7
Charsadda 1,171,000 0 0 X
Ghazi 163,000 0 0 X
Pattan S/D 124,000 0 0 X
Mansehra 808,000 0 0 X
Chakisar 111,000 0 0 X
Dir S/D 508,000 0 0 X
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